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We determine the secrecy capacities of AVQCs. Both secrecy capacity with average error proba-
bility and with maximal error probability are derived. Both derivations are based on one common
code construction. The code we construct fulfills a stringent secrecy requirement, which is called the
strong code concept. As an application of our result for secret message transmission over AVQCs,
we determine when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters and com-
pletely characterize its discontinuity points both for average error criterion and for maximal error
criterion. Furthermore, we prove the phenomenon “super-activation” for secrecy capacities of arbi-
trarily varying quantum channels, i.e., two quantum channels both with zero secrecy capacity, which,
if used together, allow secure transmission with positive capacity. We give therewith an answer to the
question “When is the secrecy capacity a continuous function of the system parameters?”, which has
been listed as an open problem in quantum information problem page of the ITP Hannover. We also
discuss the relations between the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating
capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity for AVQCs. R. Ahlswede, I. Bjelaković, H.
Boche, and J. Nötzel made in 2013 the conjecture that the entanglement generating capacity of an
AVQC is equal to its entanglement generating capacity under shared randomness assisted quantum
coding. We state the conditions under which the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of sys-
tem parameters. We demonstrate that the validity of this conjecture implies that the entanglement
generating capacity, the entanglement distillation capacity, and the strong subspace transmission
capacity of an AVQC are continuous functions of the system parameters. Consequently, under the
premise of this conjecture, the secrecy capacities of an AVQC differ significantly from the general
quantum capacities.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the developments in modern communication systems have produced many results in a short
amount of time. Quantum communication systems especially, allow us to exploit new possibilities while at the same
time imposing fundamental limitations.
Quantum mechanics differs significantly from classical mechanics, it has its own laws. Quantum information theory
unifies information theory with quantum mechanics, generalizing classical information theory to the quantum world.
The unit of quantum information is called the "qubit", the quantum analogue of the classical “bit”. Unlike a bit, which
is either “0” or “1”, a qubit can be in a “superposition”, i.e., two states at the same time. This property has turned
into one of the fundamental resources of quantum information processing.
A quantum channel is a communication channel which can carry quantum information, e.g., photons. Two of the
most standard ways to represent a quantum channel with linear algebraic tools are a sum of several transformations,
or as a single isometry, which explicitly includes the unobserved environment.
A quantum channel can transmit both classical and quantum information. If the sender wants to transmit a classical
message of a finite set A to the receiver using a quantum channel N , his encoding procedure will include a classical-to-
quantum encoder to prepare a quantum message state ρ suitable as an input for the channel. If the sender’s encoding
is restricted to transmit an indexed finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A}, then we can consider the choice of the
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2signal quantum states ρx as a component of the channel. This is equivalent to considering the classical capacity of
quantum channels.
Our goal is to investigate communication that takes place over a quantum channel which is, in addition to the noise
from the environment, subjected to the action of a jammer who actively manipulates the states. The messages should
also be kept secret from an eavesdropper.
Preceding work in quantum information theory has mostly focused on either of the two attacks. Our goal is to
deliver a more general theory considering both channel robustness and security in quantum information theory. By
doing so, we build on the preceding works [13] and [19]. Furthermore, we are interested in the delivery of large volumes
of messages over many channel uses, so that we study the asymptotic behavior of the system.
A channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying channel, where the jammer may change his input in every
channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. In this model we consider such a channel
which is not stationary and can change with every use. Communication over this channel works as follows: At first
the sender and the receiver have to select their coding scheme. After that, the jammer makes his choice of the channel
state to sabotage the message transmission. However, due to the physical properties, we assume that the jammer’s
changes only take place in a set which is known to the sender and the receiver.
The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced in [12]. [2] showed a surprising result which is known as the
Ahlswede Dichotomy: Either the capacity for message transmission of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero or it equals
its shared randomness assisted capacity. After the discovery in [2] it has remained an open question as to when the
deterministic capacity is positive for several years. In [26], a sufficient condition for that has been given, and in [24],
it is proved that this condition is also necessary. The Ahlswede Dichotomy demonstrates the importance of shared
randomness for communication in a very clear form.
A quantum channel with a jammer is called an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. It is defined as a family of
indexed channels {Nθ : θ = 1, . . . , T}, where θ is called a channel state of the channel pair. This channel state θ, which
varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, governs the channel. In [4], the classical capacity of arbitrarily
varying quantum channels has been analyzed, and a lower bound on the capacity has been given. An alternative proof
and a proof of the strong converse are both given in [11]. In [3], the Ahlswede Dichotomy for the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channels is established, and a sufficient and necessary condition for the zero deterministic capacity
is given. In [19], a simplification of this condition for the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels is given. [3]
and [16] complete the characterization of message transmission capacity for the arbitrarily varying channel. In [3],
message transmission, key transmission, and strong subspace transmission have been considered. A full description of
these transmission tasks has been completely established. In [19] an example has been given showing there are indeed
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels which have zero deterministic capacity and positive random capacity.
In this work we rendered these results to secrecy message transmission over arbitrarily varying quantum channels,
which is the full description of secure message transmission and key transmission through arbitrarily varying quantum
wiretap channels.
The noise affecting the transmission over a noisy quantum channel can be interpreted as interaction with the
environment. Following the general protocol of [25], we say this environment is completely under the control of the
eavesdropper. Secure communication over a classical channel with an eavesdropper was first introduced in [44]. A
classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classical-quantum wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity
for classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper has been determined in [25] and [23].
This work is an extension of our previous papers [16], [17], and [18], where we considered channel robustness
against jamming, and concurrently security against eavesdropping for classical-quantum channels (cf. Section II B),
where classical-quantum channels are quantum channels whose sender’s inputs are classical variables. In our earlier
works [16], [17], and [18], we investigated secret message transmission over a classical-quantum channel. The messages
were kept secret from an eavesdropper. Communication took place over a quantum channel which was, in addition to
noise from the environment, subjected to the action of a jammer, which actively manipulated the states. A classical-
quantum channel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper is called an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap
channel. It is defined as a family of pairs of indexed channels {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ = 1, . . . , T} with a common input alphabet
and possible different output systems, connecting a sender with two receivers, a legal one and a wiretapper. The
legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel Wθ in the pair, and the wiretapper observes the output of
the second channel Vθ, respectively. θ governs both the legal receiver’s channel and the wiretap channel. A code for the
channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper’s knowledge of the transmitted information
can be kept arbitrarily small. In [16], [17], and [18], the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
wiretap channels is established, i.e. either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel is zero or is equal
to its shared randomness assisted capacity. We delivered the formula for secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel. A full description of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels
is thus established with these earlier contributions [16], [17], and [18] when we combine their results. Currently only
the message transmission capacity of arbitrarily varying quantum channels can be completely characterized (cf. [3],
3[19], and [20]). The entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace
transmission capacity of arbitrarily varying quantum channels can only be determined for the case when the respective
capacity is positive by now ([3]), i.e., the characterization of these capacities when the respective capacity is equal to
zero is still an open problem.
In this work we determine the secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying quantum channels. We also give an example
showing that there are indeed arbitrarily varying quantum channels which have zero deterministic secrecy capacity
and positive randomness assisted secrecy capacity. The deterministic secrecy capacity and the randomness assisted
secrecy capacity of an AVQC is thus in general not equal. This behavior comes as quite a surprise because in [3] the
authors conjectured equality of deterministic capacity and randomness assisted capacity for entanglement distillation,
entanglement generating, and strong subspace transmission for arbitrarily varying quantum channels.
The capacities of classical arbitrarily varying channel under maximal error criterion and under the average error
criterion are in general, not equal. The capacity formula of classical arbitrarily varying channels under maximal error
criterion is still an open problem. Interestingly, [19] shows that the capacities of an arbitrarily varying quantum
channel under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are equal (cf. Remark II.6, Remark IV.7,
and Remark IV.8). In Section IVB we extend this observation: We show that the secrecy capacities of an arbitrarily
varying quantum channel under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are equal. For the proof
we have to construct two sets of superposition codes to show the positivity of the secure capacity under maximal error
criterion.
As an application of our results, we turn to the question: Is the secrecy capacity a continuous function of the system
parameters? The analysis of the continuity of capacities of quantum channels is motivated by the question of whether
small changes in the channel system are able to cause dramatic losses in the performance. The continuity of the
message and entanglement transmission capacity of a stationary memoryless quantum channel has been listed as an
open problem in [45] and was solved in [33]. Considering quantum channels with active jamming faces an especially
new difficulty. The reason is that the capacity in this case is, in general, not solely specified by entropy quantities.
In [20] the conditions under which the message transmission capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is
continuous have been delivered. The condition for continuity of message transmission capacity of a classical arbitrarily
varying wiretap channel has been given in [43]. We shall discuss the context of the entanglement distillation capacity,
the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity in Section III and in Section IV.
The continuity of the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying channel under randomness assisted quantum
coding has been shown in [22]. This proof is still capable of improvements, since in general, the legal channel users
do not have control over the the eavesdropper’s channel. However, this proof requires that the output alphabet of
the eavesdropper’s channel is of finite cardinality. In this work we show that the continuity of the secrecy capacity
of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel under randomness assisted quantum coding only depends on the legal
channel. Moreover, we improve the result of [22] when we give a generalized control function. This control function
only depends on the legal channel.
Furthermore, we show as a consequence of our results that there is a phenomenon called “super-activation” for the
secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying quantum channels, i.e., two arbitrarily varying quantum channels, each useless
for secure message transmission, can be super-activated to acquire positive secrecy capacity when used together.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Basic properties, Communication Scenarios, and Notations
For a finite set A we denote the set of probability distributions on A by P (A). Let ρ1 and ρ2 be Hermitian operators
on a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space G. We say ρ1 ≥ ρ2 and ρ2 ≤ ρ1 if ρ1 − ρ2 is positive-semidefinite. For
a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space G, we denote the (convex) space of density operators on G by
S(G) := {ρ ∈ L(G) : ρ is Hermitian, ρ ≥ 0G , tr(ρ) = 1} ,
where L(G) is the set of linear operators on G, and 0G is the null matrix on G. Note that any operator in S(G) is
bounded.
For any finite set A, any finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space H, and n ∈ N, we define An :=
{
(a1, · · · , an) :
ai ∈ A ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
}
, and H⊗n := span
{
v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vn : vi ∈ H ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
}
. We write an for the elements of
An.
We denote the identity operator on a space H by idH and the symmetric group on {1, · · · , n} by Sn. For a set A
on a Euclidean space G we define the convex hull of A by Conv(A).
4For a discrete random variable X on a finite set A and a discrete random variable Y on a finite set B, we denote
the Shannon entropy of X by H(X) = −∑x∈A p(x) log p(x) and the mutual information between X and Y by
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B p(x, y) log
(
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
)
. Here p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution function of X and Y ,
and p(x) and p(y) are the marginal probability distribution functions of X and Y respectively, and “log” means
logarithm to base 2.
For a quantum state ρ ∈ S(H) we denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ by
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by GP and GQ, respectively. Let φPQ
be a bipartite quantum state in S(GPQ). We denote the partial trace over GP by
trP(φ
PQ) :=
∑
l
〈l|PφPQ|l〉P ,
where {|l〉P : l} is an orthonormal basis of GP. We denote the conditional entropy by
S(P | Q)ρ := S(φPQ)− S(φQ) ,
where φQ = trP(φPQ).
Let Φ := {ρx : x ∈ A} be a set of quantum states labeled by elements of A. For a probability distribution Q on A,
the Holevo quantity χ is defined as
χ(Q; Φ) := S
(∑
x∈A
Q(x)ρx
)
−
∑
x∈A
Q(x)S (ρx) .
Note that we can always associate a state ρXY =
∑
xQ(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx to (Q; Φ) such that χ(Q; Φ) = I(X;Y ) holds
for the quantum mutual information.
For a probability distribution P on a finite set A and a positive constant δ, we denote the set of typical sequences
by
T nP,δ :=
{
an ∈ An :
∣∣∣∣ 1nN(a′ | an)− P (a′)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ|A|∀a′ ∈ A
}
,
where N(a′ | an) is the number of occurrences of the symbol a′ in the sequence an.
For finite-dimensional complex Hilbert spaces G and G′, a quantum channel N : S(G)→ S(G′), S(G) 3 ρ→ N(ρ) ∈
S(G′) is represented by a completely positive trace-preserving map L(G)→ L(G′) which accepts input quantum states
in S(G) and produces output quantum states in S(G′).
Definition II.1. Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by HP and HQ,
respectively, and let Θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite set.
For every θ ∈ Θ, let Nθ be a quantum channel S(HP) → S(HQ). We call the set of the quantum channels
{Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} an arbitrarily varying quantum channel when the state θ varies from symbol to symbol in an
arbitrary manner.
The following Definition II.2 plays a very important role for the characterization of the capacity of arbitrarily
varying quantum channels. The intuitive meaning of this is that the jammer can choose the state of the channel such
that any two send sequences of quantum states of any length, may be confused by the receiver.
Definition II.2. Let L ∈ N. We say that the arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is L-symmetrizable
if for every ρL, ρ′L ∈ S(HPL) there exists a map τ which maps from {ρL, ρ′L} to the set of distributions on ΘL such
that ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(ρL)(θL)NθL(ρ
′L) =
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(ρ′L)(θL)NθL(ρ
L) . (1)
We say that the arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable if {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is L-
symmetrizable for all L ∈ N.
5Remark II.3. In [20] the L-symmetrizability was defined as follows: We say that {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is L-symmetrizable if
for every finite set {ρL1 , · · · , ρLK} ⊂ S(HP
L
) there exists a τ such that for all ρL, ρ′L ∈ {ρL1 , · · · , ρLK}, (1) holds. The
authors then showed that we might limit the cardinality K to K = 2, which is the condition for L-symmetrizability
defined in (1). Thus the two conditions for L-symmetrizability are equivalent.
B. Problem Definition and Basic Definitions
Two of the common ways to represent a quantum channel, i. e. a completely positive trace-preserving map L(HP)→
L(HQ), with linear algebraic tools, are:
1. Operator sum decomposition (Kraus representation)
N(ρ) =
K∑
i=1
AiρAi
∗ , (2)
where A1, . . . , AK (Kraus operators) are linear operators HP → HQ (cf.[31], [7], and [35]). They satisfy the trace-
preserving relation
∑K
i=1Ai
∗Ai = idHP . The representation of a quantum channel N according to (2) is not unique.
Let A1, . . . , AK and B1, . . . , BK′ be two sets of Kraus operators (by appending zero operators to the shorter list of
operation elements we may ensure that K ′ = K). Suppose A1, . . . , AK represents N , then B1, . . . , BK also represents
N if and only if there exists a K ×K unitary matrix (ui,j)i,j=1,...,K such that for all i we have Ai =
∑K
j=1 ui,jBj (cf.
[35]).
2. Isometric extension (Stinespring dilation)
N(ρ) = trE (UNρU
∗
N ) , (3)
where UN is a linear operator HP → HQE such that U∗NUN = idHP , and E is the quantum system of the environment
(cf. [39], [7], and also cf. [42] for a more general Stinespring dilation theorem). HE can be chosen such that dimHE ≤
(dimHP)2. The isometric extension of a quantum channel N according to (3) is not unique either. Let U and U ′ be
two linear operators HP → HQE. Suppose U represents N , then U ′ also represents N if and only if U and U ′ are
unitarily equivalent.
It is well known that we can deduce each of these two representations of the quantum channel from the other
one. Let A1, . . . , AK be a set of Kraus operators which represents N . Let {|j〉E : j = 1, . . . ,K} be an orthonormal
system on HE. Then UN =
∑K
j=1Aj ⊗ |j〉E is an isometric extension which represents N , since
(∑K
j=1Aj ⊗ |j〉E
)
ρ(∑K
k=1Ak ⊗ |k〉E
)∗
=
∑K
j=1AjρAj
∗ and
(∑K
j=1Aj ⊗ |j〉E
)∗ (∑K
k=1Ak ⊗ |k〉E
)
=
∑K
j=1Aj
∗Aj . For the other way
around, every isometric extension UN that represents N can be written in the form UN =
∑K
j=1Aj ⊗ |j〉E, i.e. if the
sender sends ρ, and if the environment’s measurement gives |i〉E, the receiver’s outcome will be 1|AiρAi∗|1AiρAi
∗. Here
A1, . . . , AK is a set of Kraus operators which represents N , and {|j〉E : j = 1, . . . ,K} is an orthonormal system on
HE.
6FIG. 1: Arbitrarily varying quantum channel
We aim to analyze secret message transmission over a quantum channel. This channel connects the sender and the
legal receiver, conveying information from the former to the latter. It is subject to active attacks: A jammer may
change his input in every channel use and is not restricted to use a repetitive probabilistic strategy. If we do not
consider security, we have a situation as shown in Figure 1, where public messages are transmitted. This scenario is
described by a tripartite system with the sender, the legal receiver, and the jammer.
Following [25] we now define the secret message transmission protocol when we assume that the environment is
completely under the control of the eavesdropper.
Definition II.4. Let P and Q be quantum systems and Θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite set. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an
arbitrarily varying quantum channel. Following [25] we assume that the environment E is completely under the control
of the eavesdropper in the following sense:
Let ρP → UNθρPU∗Nθ be an isometric transformation which represents Nθ, where UNθ is a linear operator S(HP)
→ S(HQE), and E is the quantum system of the environment. HE can be chosen such that dimHE ≤ (dimHP)2. Fix
a ρP with eigen-decomposition
∑
x∈X p(x)|φx〉P〈φx|P. If the channel state is θ, the local output density matrix seen
by the receiver is
trE
(∑
x
p(x)UNθ |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nθ
)
,
and the local output density matrix seen by the environment (which we interpret as the wiretapper) is
trQ
(∑
x
p(x)UNθ |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nθ
)
.
Therefore {V ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} defines an arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum channel
{(Nθ, V ′θ ) : θ ∈ Θ} ,
where Nθ : HP → HQ,
∑
x∈X p(x)|φx〉〈φx|P → trE
(∑
x p(x)UNθ |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nθ
)
, and V ′θ : H
P → HE,∑
x∈X p(x)|φx〉〈φx|P → trQ
(∑
x p(x)UNθ |φx〉〈φx|PU∗Nθ
)
.
7FIG. 2: Arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum channel defined by an arbitrarily varying quantum channel
The jammer and the eavesdropper here act as two additional channel users. Instead of the tripartite system of
Figure 1, we now have a quadripartite system in Figure 2. The quantum channel used by the legal parties (sender
and receiver) is subject to two attacks at the same time: one passive (eavesdropping), and one active (jamming). The
task for the legal transmitters is to transmit private information (secret messages or secret keys) despite the jamming
attacks and at the same time to keep it secret against eavesdropping.
We consider the secrecy capacity of quantum channels carrying private information. We assume that the jammer
is an additional hostile channel user. It is effectively given by an interference channel where the legal sender and
the jammer are allowed to make inputs to the system, and the legal receiver as well as the eavesdropper, receive
the corresponding outputs. Furthermore, we assume that the eavesdropper controls the complete environment. The
jammer and the eavesdropper aim to prevent the legal parties from privately communicating, each with their own
attacking strategies, respectively.
Quantum channels can transmit both classical and quantum information. For the transmission of classical informa-
tion via a quantum channel, we first have to convert a classical message into a quantum state. We assume that the
states to be produced in the input system are given by the set {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(HP), where A is a finite set of
letters. By Section IIA, we can define the map F : A → S(HP), which is defined by A 3 x→ F (x) = ρx ∈ S(HP),
meaning that each classical input of x ∈ A leads to a distinct quantum output ρx ∈ S(HP). F defines a linear map
(a classical-quantum channel) N ◦ F := W : P (A)→ S(HQ),
P (A) 3 P →W (P ) =
∑
x
P (x)N(ρx) ∈ S(HQ) .
In view of this, we have the following definition.
Definition II.5. An (n, Jn) (deterministic) code C for an arbitrarily varying quantum channel I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}
with classical input F : A → S(HP) consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j), specified
by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of positive-semidefinite operators {Dj : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}}
on H⊗n, which is a partition of the identity, i.e.
∑Jn
j=1Dj = idH⊗n . We call these operators the decoder operators.
The average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C is defined as
Pe(C, θn) := 1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(Nθn ◦ Fn(E( |j))Dj) .
The maximal probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C is defined as
P (max)e (C, θn) := 1− min
j∈{1···Jn}
tr(Nθn ◦ Fn(E( |j))Dj) .
8A code is created by the sender and the legal receiver before the message transmission starts. The sender uses
the encoder to encode the message that he wants to send, while the legal receiver uses the decoder operators on the
channel output to decode the message.
In [25] it has been shown that codes for secure message transmission over a classical-quantum wiretap channel
can be used to build codes for entanglement transmission over a quantum channel. Please see [15] for a discussion
of entanglement generation over compound quantum channels, which are channels when the channel states do not
change with every use as in case of AVQCs, but are stationary over the time.
Remark II.6. For classical arbitrarily varying channels, capacities under the average error criterion and under max-
imal error criterion are distinguished from each other. The capacity formula for the latter one is still unknown (cf.
[2]). This statement is not true for the capacities of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel under maximal error
criterion and under the average error criterion (cf. Remark IV.7, Remark IV.8, and [11]).
We now consider, in addition to a faithful message transmission, a security requirement, i.e., a code for the channel
conveying private information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper’s knowledge of the transmitted information
can be kept arbitrarily small.
Definition II.7. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. A non-negative number R is an
achievable (deterministic) secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under the average error
criterion if for every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set A, a map F : A → S(HP),
and an (n, Jn) code C =
(
E, {Dnj : j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
θn∈Θn
Pe(C, θn) <  , (4)
max
θn∈Θn
χ (Runi;Zθn) < ζ , (5)
where Runi is a random variable uniformly distributed on {1, . . . , Jn} and
Zθn =
{
V ′θn ◦ Fn(E( |i)) : i ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}
}
,
where V ′θ is a channel to the environment defined by Nθ.
The supremum on achievable (deterministic) secrecy rates of I under the average error criterion is called the
(deterministic) secrecy capacity of I under the average error criterion, denoted by Cs(I).
Remark II.8. A weaker and widely used security criterion is obtained if we replace (5) with
maxθn∈Θn 1nχ (Runi;Zθn) < ζ. In this paper we will follow [10] and use (5).
Remark II.9. Let V ′θ : H
P → HE be a channel to the environment defined by the quantum channel Nθ : HP → HQ.
We may choose another Stinespring dilation for Nθ and obtain another channel Vθ : HP → HE to the environment.
V ′θ and Vθ are equivalent in the sense that there is a partial isometry W such that for all ρ ∈ S(HP) we have
V ′θ (ρ) = W
∗Vθ(ρ)W (ca. [38] and [30]). Thus the security criteria in Definition II.7 does not depend on which
Stinespring dilation we choose to define the channel to the environment.
Remark II.10. It is understood that the sender and the receiver have to select their coding scheme first. We assume
that this coding scheme is known by the jammer and the eavesdropper. The jammer can make use of this knowledge
to advance his attacking strategy. Our Definition 4 for the criterion of decoding error probability and Definition 5
for the security criterion require that a private information transmission can be guaranteed even in the worst case,
i.e., under the assumption that the jammer and the eavesdropper know the complete coding scheme and will choose
attacking strategies which are most advantageous for themselves.
Definition II.11. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. A non-negative number R is an
achievable (deterministic) secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under the maximal error
criterion if for every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exists a finite set A, a map F : A → S(HP),
and an (n, Jn) code C =
(
E, {Dnj : j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
θn∈Θn
P (max)e (C, θn) <  , (6)
max
θn∈Θn
χ (Runi;Zθn) < ζ , (7)
9where Runi and Zθn are defined as in Definition II.7.
The supremum on achievable (deterministic) secrecy rates of I under the maximal error criterion is called the
(deterministic) secrecy capacity of I under the maximal error criterion, denoted by Cs,max(I).
The maximal error criterion is the strongest error criterion in the sense that when we consider secret message
transmission under the maximal error criterion, we assume that the jammer not only knows the coding scheme of the
legal channel users (cf. Remark II.10), but also the actual message. Definition II.11 requires that a private information
transmission can be guaranteed even under the assumption that the jammer, knowing both the complete coding
scheme and the message, will choose the most advantaged jamming attacking strategy depending on this knowledge.
With this interpretation in mind it is intuitively clear that, if sender and receiver have the ability to use one of
many codes and the jammer is not informed about this choice anymore, the maximum- and average error criterion
become equivalent again. This intuition is sharpened in [14].
Definition II.12. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. We denote the set of (n, Jn)
deterministic codes for I by Λ.
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under
randomness assisted coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and  > 0, if n is sufficiently large, there is a finite set A,
a map F : A → S(HP), and a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
θn∈Θn
∫
Λ
Pe(Cγ , θn)dG(γ) <  ,
max
θn∈Θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi;ZCγ ,θn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Here σ is a sigma-algebra, so chosen such that the functions γ → Pe(Cγ , θn) and γ → χ (Runi;ZCγ ,θn) are both
G-measurable with respect to σ for every θn ∈ Θn. Runi and Zθn are defined as in Definition II.7.
The supremum on achievable secrecy rates for I under randomness assisted coding is called the randomness assisted
secrecy capacity of I, denoted by Cs(I, r).
Remark II.13. The randomness assisted code technique is not to be confused with the random encoding technique.
For the random encoding technique, only the sender, but not the receiver, randomly chooses a code word in An to
encode a message j according to a probability distribution. The receiver should be able to decode j even when he only
knows the probability distribution, but not which code word is actually chosen by the sender. For the randomness
assisted code technique, the sender randomly chooses a stochastic encoder Eγ , and the receiver chooses a set of the
decoder operators {Dγ′j : j = 1, · · · , Jn}. The receiver can decode the message if and only if he knows the actual
random outcome of the sender’s random variable. The use of randomized encoding diffuses the knowledge of a jammer
that has access to the code-words that are transmitted has regarding the actual message, and makes it more difficult
for him to prevent reliable communication between sender and receiver.
Definition II.14. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. We denote the set of (n, Jn)
deterministic codes for I by Λ.
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under
randomness assisted classical coding and the maximal error criterion if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and  > 0,
if n is sufficiently large, there is a finite set A, a map F : A → S(HP), and a distribution G on (Λ, σ) such that
log Jn
n > R− δ, and
max
θn∈Θn
∫
Λ
P (max)e (C, θn)dG(γ) <  ,
max
θn∈Θn
∫
Λ
χ (Runi;ZCγ ,θn) dG(γ) < ζ .
Here σ is a sigma-algebra, so chosen such that the functions γ → Pe(Cγ , θn) and γ → χ (Runi;ZCγ ,θn) are both
G-measurable with respect to σ for every θn ∈ Θn.
The supremum on achievable secrecy rates for I under randomness assisted classical coding and the maximal error
criterion is called the randomness assisted secrecy classical capacity under the maximal error criterion of I, denoted
by Cs,max(I, r).
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Definition II.15. The code concept for arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum channels is similar to the code concept
for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels in [16] and [18]. We build a two-part code word, the first
part is used to create the randomness for the sender and the legal receiver, the second is used to transmit the message
to the legal receiver. We call it a weak code concept when the first part to synchronize the second part is public,
and a strong code concept when the first part is secure.
Definition II.16. Let {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} and {Nˆθ′ : θ′ ∈ Θ′} be two arbitrarily varying quantum channels.
We say super-activation occurs to the secrecy capacity for two arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels
{Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} and {Nˆθ′ : θ′ ∈ Θ′} when the following hold:
Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) = 0 ,
Cs({Nˆθ′) : θ′ ∈ Θ′}) = 0 ,
and
Cs({Nθ ⊗ Nˆθ′ : (θ, θ′) ∈ Θ×Θ′}) > 0 .
Definition II.17. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. We define
C(I) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
(
inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)
)
. (8)
The supremum is taken over all chosen finite sets A, maps F : A → S(HP), and probability distributions P on the
input quantum states {F (x) : x ∈ A}. Here Bθ and Zθ are the resulting quantum states at the output of Nθ and V ′θ ,
respectively, where V ′θ is the channel to the environment defined by Nθ and Bq =
∑
θ q(θ)Bθ.
Let L = (Wθ, Vθ)θ∈Θ be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. We define
C(L) := lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{Bq,Zθ:q,θ}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(pU ;Zθn)
)
. (9)
Here Bθ are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate receiver’s channels. Zθn are the resulting
quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the
Markov chain relationships: U → A→ BqZθ for every Bq ∈ Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ) and θ ∈ Θ. Here A is a random variable
taking values on A, and U a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution pU .
Definition II.18. For finite sets A and B, we define a (discrete) classical channel V: P (A)→ P (B), P (A) 3 p→
V(p) ∈ P (B) to be a system characterized by a probability transition matrix V(·|·). For p ∈ P (A) and y ∈ B, V(y|p)
expresses the probability of the output symbol y when we send the symbol x through the channel. The channel is said to
be memoryless if the probability distribution of the output depends only on the input at that time and is conditionally
independent of previous channel inputs and outputs. Further, we can extend this definition when we define a classical
channel to a map V: P (A)→ P (B) by denoting V(y|p) := ∑x∈A p(x)V(y|x).
Definition II.19. Let A, B, and C be finite sets. Let Θ := {1, . . . , T} be a finite set. For every θ ∈ Θ, let Wθ be a
classical channel P (A)→ P (B) and Vθ be a classical channel P (A)→ P (C).
We call the set of the classical channel pairs {(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} a (classical) arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel when the channel state θ varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner. When the sender inputs
p ∈ P (A) into the channel, the receiver receives the output y ∈ B with probability∑x p(x)Wθ(y|x), while the wiretapper
receives the output z ∈ Z with probability ∑x p(x)Vθ(z|x).
Definition II.20. Let K = {(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. An (n, Jn) code for
K consists of a stochastic encoder E : {1, . . . , Jn} → P (An), specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·),
and a collection of mutually disjoint sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} (decoding sets).
The average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C is defined as
Pe(C, θn) := 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
E(xn|j)Wnθ (Dcj |xn) .
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Definition II.21. We say that the arbitrarily varying channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable if there exists a
parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A} on Θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A, and b ∈ B∑
θ∈Θ
τ(θ | a)Wθ(b | a′) =
∑
θ∈Θ
τ(θ | a′)Wθ(b | a) .
We say that the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable if there exists a
parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | a) : a ∈ A} on Θ such that for all a, a′ ∈ A,∑
θ∈Θ
τ(θ | a)Wθ(a′) =
∑
θ∈Θ
τ(θ | a′)Wθ(a) .
Definition II.22. Let A and B be finite sets, and H be a finite-dimensional complex Hilbert space. Let Θ := {1, 2, · · · }
be an index set. For every θ ∈ Θ, let Wθ be a classical channel P (A) → P (B) and Vθ be a classical-quantum
channel P (A) → S(H). We call the set of the classical channel/classical-quantum channel pairs {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}
a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel when the state t varies from symbol to symbol in an
arbitrary manner, while the legitimate receiver accesses the output of Wθ, and the wiretapper observes the output of
Vθ, respectively.
Definition II.23. Let J = {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel. An
(n, Jn) code C for the classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel J consists of a stochastic encoder E
: {1, · · · , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j), specified by a matrix of conditional probabilities E(·|·), and a collection of
mutually disjoint sets {Dj ⊂ Bn : j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}} (decoding sets).
Definition II.24. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the classical arbitrarily varying quan-
tum wiretap channel J = {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} under the maximal error criterion if for every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0
and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, Jn) code C =
(
E, {Dj : j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
j∈{1,··· ,Jn}
max
θ∈Θ
Wnθ (D
c
j |E(·|j)) ≤ ε , (10)
and
max
θn∈Θn
χ (Runi;Zθn) < ζ . (11)
The supremum on achievable secrecy rates for J is called the secrecy capacity of J under the maximal error criterion,
denoted by Cs,max(J).
Definition II.25. Let P and Q be quantum systems. We denote the Hilbert space of P and Q by HP and HQ,
respectively. Let Θ := {1, . . . , T} be a finite set. For every θ ∈ Θ, let Nθ be a quantum channel S(HP)→ S(HQ).
We call the set of the quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} a quantum compound channel. When the channel state is
t and the sender inputs a quantum state ρP ∈ S(HP) into the channel, the receiver receives an output quantum state
Nθ(ρ
P) ∈ S(HQ).
Definition II.26. An (n, Jn) code C for the classical-quantum compound wiretap channel {Nθ : θ ∈ θ} consists of a
stochastic encoder E : {1, · · · , Jn} → P (An), j → E(·|j) and a collection of positive-semidefinite operators
{
Dj : j
∈ {1, · · · , Jn}
}
on H⊗n, which is a partition of the identity.
We deal with two communication scenarios. In the first one, only the sender is informed about the index t, or in
other words, has CSI, where CSI is an abbreviation for “channel state information”. In the second scenario, neither
sender nor receiver has any information about that index at all.
Definition II.27. A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate with CSI at the encoder for the compound
wiretap quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} if for every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist a finite
set A, a map F : A → S(HP), and an (n, Jn) code Cθ =
(
Eθ, {D(θ)j : j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
for each θ ∈ Θ such that
log Jn
n > R− δ, and
max
θ∈Θ
1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(N⊗nθ ◦ Fn(Eθ( |j))D(θ)j ) <  , (12)
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max
θ∈Θ
χ
(
Runi;Z
⊗n
θ
)
< ζ . (13)
Here
Zθn =
{
V ′θn ◦ Fn(E( |i)) : i ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}
}
,
where V ′θ is the channel to the environment defined by Nθ.
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate with no CSI at the encoder for the compound wiretap
quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} if for every  > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist an (n, Jn) code
C = (E, {Dj : j = 1, · · · Jn}) such that log Jnn > R− δ, and
max
θ∈Θ
1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(N⊗nθ ◦ Fn(E( |j))Dj) <  , (14)
max
θ∈Θ
χ
(
Runi;Z
⊗n
θ
)
< ζ . (15)
The supremum of all secrecy rates with CSI at the encoder is called the secrecy capacity of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} with CSI,
denoted by Cs,csi({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}). The supremum of all secrecy rates with no CSI at the encoder is called the secrecy
capacity of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} (with no CSI), denoted by Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}).
III. MAIN RESULTS
Our main results are included in the following theorems and corollaries:
Theorem III.1. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel.
1) If the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I is not L-symmetrizable for some L ∈ N, then the deterministic secrecy
capacity under the strong code concept and under the average error criterion of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is given by
Cs(I) = C(L) . (16)
2) If I is L-symmetrizable for all L ∈ N, then the deterministic secrecy capacity under strong code concept and under
the average error criterion of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is equal to zero.
Corollary III.2. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. We have
Cs(I, r) = C(I) . (17)
Lemma III.3. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel. We have Cs,max(I, r) = Cs(I, r).
In other words
Cs,max(I, r) = C(I) . (18)
We distinguish here message transmission under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion.
The capacities under these two error criteria are not equal for classical arbitrarily varying channels, but equal for
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels. The capacity formula of classical arbitrarily varying channels under
maximal error criterion is still an open problem (cf. Remark IV.8).
Theorem III.4. Let I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel.
1) If the arbitrarily varying quantum channel I is not L-symmetrizable for some L ∈ N, then the deterministic secrecy
capacity under strong code concept and under the maximal error criterion of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is given by
Cs,max(I) = C(I) . (19)
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2) If I is L-symmetrizable for all L ∈ N, then the deterministic secrecy capacity under strong code concept and the
maximal error criterion of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is equal to zero.
Remark III.5. Theorem III.1 states that when an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is not L-symmetrizable for
some L ∈ N, then secret message transmission is possible even when the coding scheme of the legal transmitters is
known by the jammer and the eavesdropper.
Theorem III.4 states that when an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is not L-symmetrizable for some L ∈ N,
then secret message transmission is possible even when the coding scheme of the legal transmitters is known by the
jammer and the eavesdropper and, additionally, the jammer knows the actual message the legal channel users want to
communicate (cf. II.10).
Corollary III.6. Let Θ be a finite set and J = {(W`θ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap
channel. If J is not symmetrizable, then
Cs,max(J) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→An→{B⊗nq ,Zθn :q,θn}
(
min
q∈P (Θ)
I(pU , B`
n
q )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(pU ;Zθn)
)
. (20)
Here B`θ are the resulting classical random variables at the output of the legitimate receiver’s channels and Zθn are
the resulting quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that
satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → An → {B`⊗nq , Zθn : q, θn} for every B`q ∈ Conv((B`θ)θ∈Θ) and θ ∈ Θ.
A is here a random variable taking values on A, and U a random variable taking values on some finite set U with
probability distribution pU .
In [22] it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying channel under randomness
assisted coding is continuous if the eavesdropper’s output can be described by a finite alphabet set.
In Section VA we will show that the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel I under randomness
assisted quantum coding is continuous if the receiver’s system can be described by a finite dimensional Hilbert space
in the following sense:
Corollary III.7. Let {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum channel S(HP) → S(HQ). Let dimHQ be
finite. For a positive δ, let Cδ be the set of all arbitrarily varying quantum channels {N˙θ : θ ∈ Θ} such that
max
ρ∈S(HP)
‖Nθ(ρ)− N˙θ(ρ)‖1 < δ
for all θ ∈ Θ. ‖ · ‖1 denotes here the trace norm.
For any positive  there is a positive δ such that for all {N˙θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have
|Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, r)− Cs({(N˙θ) : θ ∈ Θ}, r)| ≤  . (21)
Corollary III.8. Let L ∈ N. For a finite set Θ and an arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, we define
FL({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ})
:= min
τ∈C(ΘL|S(HAL ))
max
ρL,ρL′
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL)NθL(ρL′)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)NθL(ρL)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
, (22)
where C
(
ΘL | S(HAL)
)
is the set of parametrized distributions sets {τ(· | ρL) : ρL ∈ AL} on ΘL and
F({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) :=
∑
L∈N
1
2L
FL({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) . (23)
The statement FL({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) = 0 is equivalent to {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} being L-symmetrizable. The statement F({Nθ : θ ∈
Θ}) = 0 is equivalent to {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} being L-symmetrizable for every L ∈ N.
Cs({Nθ : θ}), the deterministic secrecy capacity of arbitrarily varying quantum channel is discontinuous at {Nθ :
θ ∈ Θ}, if and only if the following hold:
1) The secrecy capacity of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under randomness assisted quantum coding is positive;
2) F({Nθ : θ}) = 0, but for every positive δ there is a {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ such that F({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) > 0.
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Remark III.9. The function F is defined as a uniformly convergent series of continuous functions on the set of
arbitrarily varying quantum channels. Thus F itself is also a continuous function on the set of arbitrarily varying
quantum channels.
Corollary III.8 completely characterizes the continuity behavior of AVQC’s secrecy capacity. Particularly in Section
V we show that discontinuity occurs for AVQC’s secrecy capacity. Furthermore we will discuss its relation to the
quantum capacity in Section IVA.
The following Corollary III.10 is a consequence of Corollary III.8. Corollary III.10 shows that the positive values of
the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel are stable in the sense that when the secrecy
capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel takes a positive value in an interval of the domain, then all
arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channels in a sufficiently small neighborhood also have positive secrecy capacities.
Corollary III.10. Let Θ be a finite set and {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel. When
the secrecy capacity of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is positive, then there is a δ such that for all {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have
Cs ({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) > 0 .
Corollary III.11. The deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is in general not
continuous.
Corollary III.12. Super-activation occurs for secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying quantum channels.
In [22] it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel under randomness
assisted coding is continuous in the sense of the following Lemma:
Lemma III.13. For a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel {(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where Wθ : P (A) → P (B)
and Vθ : P (A) → P (C), and a positive δ, let Cδ be the set of all classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels
{(W′θ, V ′θ ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where W′θ : P (A)→ P (B) and V′θ : P (A)→ P (C), such that
max
a∈A
‖Wθ(a)−W′θ(a)‖1 < δ
and
max
a∈A
‖Vθ(a)− V′θ(a)‖1 < δ
for all θ ∈ θ, where ‖ · ‖1 is the L1-Norm.
When |A| is finite, then for any positive  there is a positive δ such that for all {(W′θ,V′θ) : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have
|Cs({(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}; r)− Cs({((W′θ,V′θ) : θ ∈ Θ}; r)| ≤  . (24)
However, the proof for Lemma III.13 in [22] requires the outputs of the eavesdropper’s channel to be include in a
finite alphabet. Since in general, the legal channel users do not have control over the the eavesdropper’s channel, this
proof is still nonetheless capable of improvements. We will give an alternative proof for Lemma III.13 such that the
continuity does not depend on the alphabet of the eavesdropper.
In our earlier work [15] we determined the secrecy capacity of the classical-quantum compound wiretap channel.
Now we are going to consider the secrecy capacity of the compound wiretap quantum channel.
Corollary III.14. The secrecy capacity of the compound quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} in the case with CSI is given
by
CS,CSI({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) = min
θ∈Θ
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:θ}
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )− χ(pU ;Znθ ) . (25)
Here Bθ are the resulting random variables at the output of legal receiver channels, and Zθ are the resulting random
quantum states at the output of wiretap channels.
The secrecy capacity of the compound quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} in the case with CSI is given by
CS({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:θ}
(
min
θ∈Θ
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )−max
θ∈Θ
χ(pU ;Z
n
θ )
)
. (26)
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IV. COMPLETE CHARACTERIZATION OF SECRECY CAPACITY OF QUANTUM CHANNELS
A. Previous Works, Strong Code Concept, and Connection to Open Problems
In our previous works [16], [17], and [18] we considered that the sender’s encoding is restricted to transmitting an
indexed finite set of quantum states {ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(G) as a component of the channel. We obtained a channel
σx := N(ρx) with classical inputs x ∈ A and quantum outputs, which we call a classical-quantum channel. We
delivered the complete characterization of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels’ secure capacity in
our previous works. For our result in this work we use the results of those previous works in multiple calculations.
In [16], the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels has been established, i.e.
either the deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying channel was zero or equal to its shared randomness assisted
capacity. Our proof was similar to the proof of the Ahlswede Dichotomy for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum
channels in [4]: We built a two-part code word, the first part was used to create randomness for the sender and the
legal receiver, the second part was used to transmit the message to the legal receiver. Here we use the weak code
concept (cf. Definition II.15).
Lemma IV.1 (Ahlswede Dichotomy under weak code concept). Let K = {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
1. If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable, then
Cs∗(K) = Cs(K; r) . (27)
2. If {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable,
Cs∗(K) = 0 . (28)
Here Cs∗(K) and Cs(K; r) are the secrecy capacity under weak code concept and random assisted secrecy capacity
of K, respectively (cf. [16] and [18]).
We also analyzed the secrecy capacity when the sender and the receiver used various resources. In [17] we determined
the secrecy capacities under randomness assisted coding of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Lemma IV.2. Let Θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite index set. Let L = (Wθ, Vθ)θ∈Θ be an arbitrarily varying classical-
quantum wiretap channel. We have
Cs(L; r) = C(L) . (29)
We also examined in [17] when the secrecy capacity is a continuous function of the system parameters. Furthermore,
we proved the phenomenon “super-activation” for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels. Combining
the results of these two papers we obtain the formula for deterministic secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum wiretap channel.
However, that formula is still capable of improvement when we explicitly allow the eavesdropper to have a small
part of the code word be non-secure. This reduces the generality of the code concept. The code word we built was a
composition of a public code word to synchronize the second part and a randomness assisted code word to transmit
the message. We only required security for the last part. As we have shown in [18], when the jammer had access to
the first part, the code would be rendered completely useless. Thus the code concept only works when the jammer
is limited in his action, e.g., when the eavesdropper cannot send messages towards the jammer. Nevertheless, this
code concept with weak criterion could be useful when a small number of public messages were desired, e.g. when the
receiver used it to estimate the channels.
For classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channels the authors of [36] developed a new method to overcome this
problem: Applying a technique introduced in [24], they made the first part secure and used it to send the message
instead of just the randomness. The code they constructed is thus a one-part deterministic secure code. However, it
is technically difficult to extend the random classical code technique introduced in [24] to classical-quantum channels,
thus we have to come up with a different construction.
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Therefore, in [18] we considered a general code concept when we constructed a code in such a way that every part
of it is secure. We call it the strong code concept (cf. Definition II.15) . The main results of [18] are included in the
following two lemmata:
Lemma IV.3. Let L = (Wθ, Vθ)θ∈Θ be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel. If the arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable, then
Cs(L) = C(L) , (30)
when we use a two-part code word where both parts are secure.
Here Bθ are the resulting quantum states at the output of the legitimate receiver’s channels. Zθn are the resulting
quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the
Markov chain relationships: U → A→ BqZθ for every Bq ∈ Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ) and θ ∈ Θ. Here A is a random variable
taking values on A, and U a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability distribution pU .
Lemma IV.4 (Ahlswede Dichotomy under strong code concept). Let Θ be a finite set and L = {(Wθ, Vθ) :
θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel.
1) If the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable, then
Cs(L) = Cs(L; r) . (31)
2) If {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable, then
Cs(L) = 0 . (32)
Here Cs(L) is the secrecy capacity under the strong code concept (cf. [18]).
These lemmata show that when the legal channel is not symmetrizable, the sender can send a small number of
secure transmissions which push the secure capacity to the maximally attainable value. Thus, complete security is
granted.
The capacities of various communication scenarios (entanglement transmission, entanglement distillation, entangle-
ment generating, and strong subspace transmission) have been analyzed in [3], [19], and [20]. In these works the de-
terministic capacity, i.e., message capacity with no randomness assisted code, of arbitrarily varying quantum channels
for the case of positive deterministic capacity have been completely characterized. Furthermore in [3] the randomness
assisted capacities for message transmission, entanglement distillation, entanglement generating, and strong subspace
transmission of arbitrarily varying quantum channels have been completely characterized. Notably, it has been shown
in [3] that the last three capacities are equal. In addition, it has been shown that for an arbitrarily varying quantum
channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, these capacities are equal to the respective capacities of the compound quantum channel
{Np : p ∈ P (Θ)}
=
{
completely positive, trace preserving linear map N : L(HP)→ L(HQ) : ∃ p ∈ P (Θ) such that N =
∑
θ
p(θ)Nθ
}
,
where P (Θ) is the set of probability distributions on Θ. This implies that these three randomness assisted capacities
are continuous functions of the channel system parameters.
In [3], [19], and [20], the so called “Ahlswede Dichotomy” for the entanglement distillation capacity, the entanglement
generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity has been shown, i.e., each of these capacities is
either zero or equal to the respective capacity randomness assisted capacity. The question if it can actually occur that
these capacities are not equal to the respective capacities under shared randomness assisted quantum coding is still
an open problem. However in [3] the authors strongly supposed that this case will not occur. This conjecture is still
unsolved by now.
If this conjecture is true, then these three capacities under deterministic coding are continuous functions of the
channel system parameters. This means if this conjecture is true then for an AVQC, the behavior of these three
capacities under deterministic coding and the secure capacity under deterministic coding differ significantly. This is
insofar particularly interesting since in [25] Devetak used the secure capacity for the characterization of the above
mentioned three capacities for arbitrarily varying quantum channels (the achievements of the capacity formulas).
In this work, one of the major difficulties we have to overcome is the characterization of the secure deterministic
capacity when the deterministic capacity is not equal to zero. Additionally a important result is that the continuity
behavior of the secure deterministic capacity and the secure capacity under deterministic coding differ significantly
for AVQCs.
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B. Proof of the Main Results
Corollary III.2 follows immediately from the definition of the randomness assisted secrecy capacity and Lemma
IV.2.
The following proof of Corollary III.6 is almost exact the same as our proof of the capacity formula of classical
arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channels in [17], when we apply the coding technique of [19] for the maximal
error criterion instead of coding techniques for the average error criterion.
Proof. We fix a probability distribution p ∈ P (A) and choose an arbitrarily positive δ. Let
Jn = b2infB`q∈Conv((B`θ′ )θ′∈Θ) I(p;B`
n
q )−maxθn∈Θn χ(p;Zθn )−nδc ,
and
Ln = d2maxθn∈Θn (χ(p;Zθn )+nδ)e .
Let p′(xn) :=
{
pn(xn)
pn(T np,δ) if x
n ∈ T np,δ ;
0 else
and Xn := {Xj,l}j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln} be a family of random matrices whose components are i.i.d. according to p′.
By [19], [3] and the Alternative Covering Lemma in [17], if n is sufficiently large with a positive probability there exist
a realization {xj,l}j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln} of Xn, a set of mutually disjoint sets {Dj,l : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln}}
on Bn such that for all positive , λ, all θn ∈ Θn, j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, and l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln}
W`θn(D
c
j,l|xj,l) ≤  , (33)
and
χ (Runi;Zθn) ≤ λ . (34)
The following proof of Corollary III.3 is similar to our proof of the formula for randomness assisted capacity of
classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channels.
Proof. When we apply the coding technique of [19] where it has been shown that the randomness assisted capacity of
an arbitrarily varying quantum channel under the maximal error criterion is equal to its randomness assisted capacity
under the average error criterion, and the Alternative Covering Lemma in [17] to our proof for the capacity formula
of classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channels in [17], we obtain: If n is sufficiently large with a positive
probability there exist an (n, Jn) code Cγ =
(
Eγ , {Dγj,l : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln}}
)
for γ = 1, · · · , n3 and a F
such that for all positive , λ, all θn ∈ Θn, j ∈ {1, . . . , Jn}, and l ∈ {1, · · · , Ln}
1− 1
n3
n3∑
γ=1
Nθn ◦ Fn(Dγj,l|Eγ(·|j, l)) ≤ ε , (35)
and
1
n3
n3∑
γ=1
χ (Runi;ZCγ ,θn) ≤ λ . (36)
Here for θn ∈ Θn and Cγ = {(w(j)n,γ , Dγj ) : j = 1, . . . , Jn},
ZCγ ,θn := {Vθn(w(1)n,γ), Vθn(w(2)n,γ), . . . , Vθn(w(n)n,γ)} .
Now we will deliver the proof for Theorem III.1:
Proof. i) Proof of 2)
In [20], the following was shown: When I is L-symmetrizable for all L ∈ N, then for any chosen A and F : A
→ S(HP), the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel {Nθ ◦F : θ ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable. By Lemma IV.4, the
secrecy capacity concept of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} with any classical input is equal to zero. Thus 2) holds.
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ii) Converse for 1)
Now let us assume that there is a L′ ∈ N such that I is L′-symmetrizable.
We fix a finite set A, and a map F : A → S(HP). By Lemma IV.4, the secrecy capacity under strong code for the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Nθ ◦ F, V ′θ ◦ F ) : θ ∈ Θ} under strong code concept cannot
exceed lim supn→∞
1
n supp infq∈P (Θ) (χ(P,B
n
q )−maxθn∈Θn χ(p, Zθn)). Thus
Cs(I) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
(
inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)
)
. (37)
iii) Achievement for 1)
We assume that there is a L′ ∈ N such that I is not L′-symmetrizable.
When
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
( inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)) ≤ 0
holds, we have Cs(I) = 0 by (37), and there is nothing to prove.
Now we assume there is a finite set of letter A′, a map F ′ : A′ → S(H), and a distribution p′ on {F ′(x) : x ∈ A′}
such that for sufficiently large n we have
1
n
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p′;B′⊗nq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p′;Z ′θn)
)
> 0 , (38)
where B′θ and Z ′θ are the resulting quantum states at the outputs of Nθ ◦ F ′ and V ′θ ◦ F ′, respectively.
In [20] a technique has been introduced to construct an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel by means of
an arbitrarily varying quantum channel with positive deterministic capacity. However this technique does not work
for the classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel since it cannot provide security. We have to find a more
sophisticated way.
We have used a trick for the proof of Lemma IV.3 in [18] to define a set of classical-quantum channels with
positive deterministic secure capacity in sense of the strong code concept. However, the construction of an arbitrarily
varying classical-quantum wiretap channel by means of an arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel with positive
deterministic secure capacity in sense of the strong code concept is even harder. We have to combine the technique in
[18], the technique of [20] and additionally, the concept of block coding for our proof, where we get a deterministic code
word which is a composition of a ((log log n)3, (log n)3) secret deterministic code word and a ((log n)2−(log logn)3, n3)
secret random code word (cf. Remark IV.5).
a) Definition of an arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel which is not symmetrizable
When {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not L′-symmetrizable, then it is also not L-symmetrizable for all L > L′ (cf. [20]). We choose
a L ≥ L′ such that
1
L
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p′;B′⊗Lq )− max
θL∈ΘL
χ(p′;Z ′θL)
)
= C1 > 0 . (39)
We now combine the idea of [20] and the concept of block coding to define a set of classical-quantum channels.
We denote the dimension ofHA by d. For every L˘ ∈ N we choose arbitrarily d2L˘ density operators M¯i, i = 1, · · · , dL˘
2
which span the space of Hermitian operators on HA
L˘
. We define a new set of letters A1 := A′ ∪ {1, · · · , d2} and a
map F : A1 → S(H) by
F (a) =
{
F ′(a) if a ∈ A′ ;
M¯a if a ∈ {1, · · · , d2} .
When {NθL ◦ F˘ : θL ∈ ΘL} is symmetrizable then there is a {τ(· | aL) : aL ∈ UL} on ΘL such that∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | aL)NθL ◦ FL(a′L) =
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | a′L)NθL ◦ FL(aL)
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for all a, a′ ∈ A1.
This implies that ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | iL)NθL(M¯i) =
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | i′L)NθL(M¯i′)
for all i, i′ ∈ {1, · · · , dL2}.
Since {M¯i : i = 1, · · · , dL2} spans the space of Hermitian operators on HAL , {NθL : ΘL ∈ ΘL} is L-symmetrizable.
This is a contradiction to our assumption. Therefore {NθL ◦ FL : θL ∈ ΘL} is not symmetrizable.
b) The secure transmission of the message with a deterministic code
We define a distribution p on {FL(aL) : aL ∈ AL1 } by
p
(
FL(aL)
)
=
{
p′
(
FL(aL)
)
if aL ∈ A′L ;
0 else
.
By (39)
1
L
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p;B′⊗Lq )− max
θL∈ΘL
χ(p;Z ′θL)
)
=
1
L
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p′;B′⊗Lq )− max
θL∈ΘL
χ(p′;Z ′θL)
)
= C1 , (40)
where Bθ and Zθ are the resulting quantum states at the outputs of Nθ ◦ F and V ′θ ◦ F , respectively.
We apply block coding and regarding L uses of the quantum channel as a single quantum channel. Since {NθL ◦FL :
θL ∈ ΘL} is not symmetrizable, by Lemma IV.3, (40) implies that
Cs
({(NθL ◦ FL, V ′θL ◦ FL) : θL ∈ ΘL}) = C1 > 0 .
By Corollary III.3, for any (n, Jn) randomness assisted quantum code there exists an (n, Jn) randomness assisted
quantum code using randomness on a set of polynomial order of n (actually a set of size of n3) with the same secrecy
rate (cf. [16] for the reduction of randomness).
Since (log n)2  3 lognC1 we can build a ((log n)2, n3) code (E`L(logn)
2
, {D`L(logn)2i : i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}}) such that for
any positive ε when n is sufficiently large we have
1− min
θL(logn)2∈ΘL(logn)2
min
i∈{1,··· ,n3}
NθL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(
E`L(logn)
2
(· | i)
)
D`
L(logn)2
i
≤ ε (41)
and
max
θL(logn)2∈ΘL(logn)2
∥∥∥V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)2 (E`L(logn)2 (· | i))− ΞθL(logn)2∥∥∥
1
≤ ε , (42)
where ΞθL(logn)2 is a quantum state which is independent of i (cf. [18]).
Remark IV.5. Note that each code word of this ((log n)2, n3) secret deterministic code itself is actually a composition
of a ((log logn)3, (log n)3) secret deterministic code word and a ((log n)2 − (log log n)3, n3) secret random code word
(cf. [18]).
iv) The secure transmission of both the message and the randomization index
Recall that by (40),
1
n
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p;B⊗nq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p;Zθn)
)
=
1
n
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p′;B′⊗nq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p′;Z ′θn)
)
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where Bθ and Zθ are the resulting quantum states at the outputs of Nθ ◦ F and V ′θ ◦ F , respectively.
We choose an arbitrary positive δ. Let
Jn =
1
n
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p;B⊗nq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p;Zθn)
)
− δ .
By Lemma IV.2 (cf. [17] for details), if n is sufficiently large we can construct an (n, Jn) randomness assisted
quantum code
{(
En, {Dnj,i : j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}}
)
: i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}
}
, and positive λ, ζ, such that for all θn ∈ Θn
1
n!
1
Jn
∑
pi∈Sn
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Nθn ◦ F ′n (En(pi(·|j)))PpiDnj P †pi
) ≥ 1− 2−n1/16λ , (43)
and for all θn ∈ Θn, j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn} and all i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}
‖V ′θn ◦ F ′n (pi(En(·|j)))− PpiΞpi−1(θn)P †pi‖1 < 2−
√
nζ , (44)
where Ξθn ∈ S(Hn) is a quantum state which is independent of j and i (cf. [18]).
Using the technique of Lemma IV.1 (cf. [16] for details) to reduce the amount of randomness if n is sufficiently
large, we can find a set {pi1, · · · , pin3} ⊂ Sn such that
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
Nθn ◦ F ′n (pii(En(·|j)))PpiiDnj P †pii
) ≥ 1− 2−n1/16λ , (45)
and for all θn ∈ Θn, j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn} and all i ∈ {1, · · · , n3}
‖V ′θn ◦ F ′n (pii(En(·|j)))− PpiiΞpi−1i (θn)P
†
pii‖1 < 2−
√
nζ , (46)
where Ξθn ∈ S(Hn) is a quantum state which is independent of j and i (cf. [18]).
Furthermore, by the permutation-invariance of p we also have Ξθn = PpiΞpi(θn)P †pi for all pi ∈ Sn.
We now define our secure (L(log n)2 + n, Jn + n3) code for {(Nθ ◦ F, V ′θ ◦ F ) : θ ∈ Θ} by
EL(logn)
2+n(aL(logn)
2+n | i, j) := E`L(logn)2(aL(logn)2 |i) · En(pii(an)|j) , (47)
for every a(logn)
3+n = (a(logn)
3
, an) ∈ U(logn)3+n and
D
L(logn)2+n
i,j := D`
L(logn)2
i ⊗ (PpiiDnj P †pii) . (48)
By (41) and (45), for every θL(logn)
2+n = (θL(logn)
2
, θn) ∈ ΘL(logn)2+n, we have
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
(
NθL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))DL(logn)2+ni,j
)
=
1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
tr
([
NθL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ (Nθn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))
]
[
D`
L(logn)2
i ⊗ (PpiiDnj P †pii)
])
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
tr
([
NθL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))D`L(logn)2i
]
⊗
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
(Nθn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))PpiiDnj P †pii
)
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=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
(
tr
(
NθL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))D`L(logn)2i
)
· tr
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
(Nθn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))PpiiDnj P †pii
)
≥ 1− 1
n1/16
2λ − 2 · 2−n1/16λ
≥ 1− ε (49)
for any positive ε when n is sufficiently large.
By (42) and (46), for every θL(logn)
2+n = (θL(logn)
2
, θn) ∈ θL(logn)2+n and i ∈ {1, · · · , n3} and j ∈ {1, · · · , Jn}, we
have
‖V ′θL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))− ΞθL(logn)2 ⊗ Ξθn‖1
= ‖V ′θL(logn)2◦FL(logn)2
(
E`L(logn)
2
(· | i)
)
⊗ V ′θn ◦ Fn (pi(En(·|j)))− ΞθL(logn)2 ⊗ Ξθn‖1
<
1√
n
2ζ + 2 · 2−
√
nζ . (50)
Lemma IV.6 (Fannes-Audenaert Ineq., cf. [27], [6]). Let Φ and Ψ be two quantum states in a d-dimensional
complex Hilbert space and ‖Φ−Ψ‖ ≤ µ < 1e , then
|S(Φ)− S(Ψ)| ≤ µ log(d− 1) + h(µ) , (51)
where h(ν) := −ν log ν − (1− ν) log(1− ν) for ν ∈ [0, 1].
The Fannes Inequality was first introduced in [27], where it has been shown that |S(X)− S(Y)| ≤ µ log d− µ logµ.
In [6] the result of [27] has been improved, and (51) has been proved.
Let Rn3 be the uniform distribution on {1, · · · , n3}. We define a random variable Rn3,uni on the set {1, · · · , n3} ×
{1, · · · , Rn} by Rn3,uni := Rn3 ×Runi. Applying Lemma IV.6 we obtain
max
θL(logn)2+n∈θL(logn)2+n
χ
(
Rn3,uni;ZθL(logn)2+n
)
≤ max
θL(logn)2∈θL(logn)2
χ
(
Rn3 ;ZθL(logn)2
)
+
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
max
θn∈θn
χ
(
Runi;V
′
θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ Zθn,pii
)
= max
θL(logn)2∈θL(logn)2
[
S
 1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))

− 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))
]
+
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
max
θn∈θn
[
S
(
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ (V ′θn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))
)
− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ (V ′θn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))
)]
≤ max
θL(logn)2∈θL(logn)2
[ ∣∣∣∣∣S
 1
n3
1
Jn
n3∑
i=1
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))

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− S (ΞθL(logn)2 ⊗ Ξθn)
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣S (ΞθL(logn)2 ⊗ Ξθn)− 1n3
n3∑
i=1
S
 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2+n ◦ FL(logn)
2+n(EL(logn)
2+n(· | i, j))
∣∣∣∣∣
]
+ max
θn∈θn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
[ ∣∣∣∣∣S
(
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ (V ′θn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))
)
− S
(
V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ Ξθn
)∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣S (V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)2(E`L(logn)2(·|i))⊗ Ξθn)
− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
S
(
V ′θL(logn)2 ◦ FL(logn)
2
(E`L(logn)
2
(·|i))⊗ (V ′θn ◦ Fn(pii(En(·|j))))
)∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ ( 1√
n
2ζ + 2 · 2−
√
nζ) log(dL(logn)
2 − 1) + h( 1√
n
2ζ + 2 · 2−
√
nζ)
+ 2 · 2−
√
nζ log(dn − 1) + h(2 · 2−
√
nζ)
≤ ε (52)
for any positive ε when n is sufficiently large. Here Zi,θn denotes the resulting quantum state at V ′θn ◦ Fn after
i ∈ {1, · · · , n3} has been sent with EL(logn)2 .
For any positive δ, if n is sufficiently large, we have 1n log Jn − 1L(logn)2+n log Jn ≤ δ. Thus
Cs(I) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
(
inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)
)
− 2δ . (53)
Next we will deliver the proof for Theorem III.4.
Proof. Let Θ := {1, · · · , T} be a finite index set. Let {(Nθ, V ′θ ) : θ ∈ Θ} be an arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum
channel defined by an arbitrarily varying quantum channel I = {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Cs(I) ≥ Cs,max(I) (54)
follows directly from the definitions. Thus the converse is trivial.
Now we are going to prove the achievability. When I is L-symmetrizable for all L ∈ N, then by Theorem III.1, we
have Cs(I) = 0. When
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
( inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)) ≤ 0
holds, we also have Cs(I) = 0. By (54), there is nothing to prove in this case.
We assume that there is a L′ ∈ N such that I is not L′-symmetrizable, and
lim sup
n→∞
1
n
sup
A,F,P
( inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bnq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(P,Zθn)) > 0
holds.
Now we assume there is a finite set of letters A′, a map F ′ : A′ → S(H), and a distribution p′ on {F ′(x) : x ∈ A′}
such that for sufficiently large n and some p′ ∈ P (A′) we have
1
n
(
inf
B′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p′;B′⊗nq )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p′;Z ′θn)
)
> c (55)
for a positive c. Here B′θ and Z ′θ are the resulting quantum states at the outputs of Nθ ◦F ′ and V ′θ ◦F ′, respectively.
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We choose an arbitrary positive µ and define
J ′m := bexp( inf
q∈P (Θ)
χ(P,Bmq )− 2mµ)c .
By Corollary III.3, if m is sufficiently large we can find a (m,J ′m) randomness assisted quantum code
{(
E′γ , {D′γj :
j ∈ {1, · · · , J ′m}}
)
: γ ∈ Γ
}
and positive λ, ζ such that for all θm ∈ Θm
min
j∈{1,··· ,J′m)}
1
|Γ|
∑
γ∈Γ
tr
(
Nθm ◦ F ′m(E′γ( |j))D′γj
) ≥ 1− 2−m1/16λ . (56)
When I is not L′-symmetrizable for some L′ ∈ N, by [3] if m is sufficiently large, there exist quantum states σ1, σ2
∈ S(Hm) and positive-semidefinite operators D˙1, D˙2 on H⊗m, where D˙1 + D˙2 = 1H⊗m , such that for all θm ∈ Θm
and i ∈ {1, 2}
tr
(
Nθm(σi)D˙i
)
>
1
2
. (57)
We define a new set of letters A2 by A2 := A′ ∪ {1, 2} and for every θm ∈ Θm a classical-quantum channel N˙θm
: A2 → S(Hm) by
N˙θm(a) =
{
Nθm(F
′m(a)) if a ∈ A′ ;
Nθm(σa) if a ∈ {1, 2} .
We define a p ∈ P (A2) by
p(a) =
{
p′(a) if a ∈ A′ ;
0 if a ∈ {1, 2} .
By (55) and (56) it holds
1
m
(
inf
B˙q∈Conv((B˙θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(p; B˙⊗mq )− max
θm∈Θm
χ(p;Z ′θm)
)
> c , (58)
where B˙θm are the resulting quantum states at the outputs of N˙θm .
By Theorem 1 of [17], if m′ is sufficiently large we can find a (m′, 2) code
(
E˙, {D¨j : j ∈ {3, 4}}
)
and positive λ, ζ
such that for all θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′
min
j∈{3,4}
tr
(
N˙θmm′ (E˙( |j))D¨j
)
≥ 1− 2−m′1/16λ (59)
and
max
j∈{3,4}
‖V ′θmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′ (
E˙( |j))
)
− Ξθmm′‖1 < 2−
√
m′ζ (60)
for a Ξθmm′ ∈ S(Hmm
′
) which is independent of j.
Now for every θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′ we construct a classical channel N¨θmm′ : P ({1, 2, 3, 4}) → P ({1, 2, 3, 4}) by
N¨θmm′ (a | b) :=

1
2 tr
(
Nθmm′ (σ
⊗m′
b )D˙
⊗m′
a
)
if a ∈ {1, 2} ;
1
2 tr
(
Nθmm′ (E˙
m′( |b))D¨a
)
if a ∈ {3, 4}
. (61)
Since 12 (D˙
⊗m′
1 + D˙
⊗m′
2 + D¨3 + D¨4) = 1Hmm′ , for every a ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} we have
∑4
b=1 N¨θmm′ (a | b) = 1, thus this
definition is valid.
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By (57), the deterministic capacity of the classical arbitrarily varying channel {N¨θmm′ : θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′} under the
maximal error criterion is positive.
By Corollary III.6, the deterministic secrecy capacity of the classical arbitrarily varying quantum wiretap channel
{
(
N¨θmm′ , V
′
θmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′)
: θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′} under the maximal error criterion is positive.
A secure deterministic code
(
E, {Sj : j}
)
for the classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
{
(
N¨θmm′ , V
′
θmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′)
: θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′} defines a secure deterministic code (E, {Dj : j}) for
{
(
Nθmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′
, V ′θmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′)
: θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′} when we define D¨j := D˙⊗m
′
j for j ∈ {1, 2} and set
1
2
∑
am∈Sj
D¨am .
Here, for amm
′
= (a1, · · · , amm′), we set D¨am = D¨a1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ D¨amm′ . Thus the deterministic secrecy capacity of the
arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channel {
(
Nθmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′
, V ′θmm′ ◦ F ′mm
′)
: θmm
′ ∈ Θmm′} under the
maximal error criterion is positive.
Similar to the proof of Theorem III.1, we can construct a code with two-part code words for {(Nθ, V ′θ ) : θ ∈ Θ}.
The first parts of the code words are used to send the randomization index to the legal receiver such that the
eavesdropper knows nothing about the randomness such that the maximal probability of the decoding error can be
kept arbitrarily small. The second parts are randomness assisted secure code words transmitting the actual secret
message such that the maximal probability of the decoding error can be kept arbitrarily small. By Corollary III.3
there exists a randomness assisted secure code such that its secure deterministic capacity under strong code concept
and the maximal error criterion is large or equal to 1n
(
infB′q∈Conv((B′θ)θ∈Θ) χ(p
′;B′⊗nq )−maxθn∈Θn χ(p′;Z ′θn)
)
. This
shows the direct part of Theorem III.4, 1).
[19] shows that the capacities of arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel under maximal error criterion and
under the average error criterion are equal. Theorem III.4 shows that the secrecy capacities of arbitrarily varying
quantum channel under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are equal.
Remark IV.7. In [3], where arbitrarily varying quantum channels were analyzed, actually the following result has
been shown:
The deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under the average error criterion
is zero if and only if for every L ∈ N and every finite set {ρL1 , · · · , ρLK} ⊂ S(HP
L
) there exists a τ such that for all
ρL, ρ′L ∈ {ρL1 , · · · , ρLK},we have∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(ρL)(ΘL)NθL(ρ
′L) =
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(ρ′L)(θL)NθL(ρ
L) . (62)
The deterministic capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under the maximal error
criterion is zero if and only if for every L ∈ N and every {ρL1 , ρL2 } ⊂ S(HP
L
) we have
Conv
({
NθL(ρ
L
1 ) : θ
L ∈ ΘL}) ∩ Conv ({NθL(ρL1 ) : θL ∈ ΘL}) 6= ∅ . (63)
In [3] the authors then showed that the zero-capacity-condition for {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under the maximal error (63) and
the L-symmetrizability in sense of Definition II.2 are equivalent.
In [19] the authors showed that the zero-capacity-condition for {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under the maximal error criterion
(63) and the L-symmetrizability in the sense of Definition II.2 is equivalent (cf. Remark II.3). This is one of the key
statements by the authors of [19] to show the equality of the capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel under
the maximal error criterion and its capacity under the average error criterion.
Remark IV.8. Interestingly, unlike for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channels, for classical arbitrarily varying
channels, the capacities under maximal error criterion and under the average error criterion are not equal. See [2]
for a discussion of the zero-capacity-condition for classical arbitrarily varying channel under maximal error criterion
and under the average error criterion.
The capacity formula of classical arbitrarily varying channels under maximal error criterion is still an open problem.
In [1] the equality of the zero-error capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying channel and its capacity under maximal
error criterion has been demonstrated. In [11] it has been shown that this equality does not hold for arbitrarily varying
classical-quantum channels.
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V. APPLICATIONS
A. Investigation of Secrecy Capacity’s Continuity
In this section we give the proof to Corollary III.7. This shows the continuity of the secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily
varying quantum channel I under randomness assisted quantum coding when the receiver’s system can be described
by a finite dimensional Hilbert space.
Proof. [42] shows that for a noisy quantum channel Nθ, when we consider interactions with the environment as an
external system, it is possible to express it as trE (UNρU∗N ), where UN is a linear operator S(HP) → S(HQE) such
that U∗NUN = idHP , and E is the quantum system of the environment. By our assumption, where we follow [25] using
a most general protocol, the environment is completely under the control of the eavesdropper. A continuity theorem
for Stinespring Dilation has been shown in [32]. This continuity theorem is one of the tools our proof is based on.
By [32], when
max
ρ∈S(HP)
‖Nθ(ρ)− N˙θ(ρ)‖1 < δ ,
there exist Stinespring dilations UNθ and UN˙θ for Nθ and N˙θ such that
max
ρ∈S(HP)
‖UNθ (ρ⊗ idP)− UN˙θ (ρ⊗ idP)‖1 < δ
for all θ ∈ Θ.
When there are Stinespring dilations UNθ and UN˙θ for Nθ and N˙θ such that
max
ρ∈S(HP)
‖UNθ (ρ⊗ idP)− UN˙θ (ρ⊗ idP)‖1 < δ ,
by the triangle inequality, we then have
max
ρ∈S(HP)
‖V ′θ (ρ)− V˙ ′θ (ρ)‖1 < δ .
We fix a finite set A, and a map F : A → S(HP). By [17], the secrecy capacity of {(Nθ ◦F, V ′θ ◦F ) : θ ∈ Θ} under
randomness assisted quantum coding is
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{B⊗nq ,Z′θn :q,θn}
(
inf
Bq∈Conv((Bθ)θ∈Θ)
χ(pU ;B
⊗n
q )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(pU ;Z
′
θn)
)
,
and for every {(N˙θ ◦ F, V˙ ′θ ◦ F ) : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ, its secrecy capacity under randomness assisted quantum coding is
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{B˙⊗nq ,Z˙′θn :q,θn}
(
inf
B˙q∈Conv((B˙θ)θ∈Θ)
χ(pU ; B˙
⊗n
q )− max
θn∈Θn
χ(pU ; Z˙
′
θn)
)
,
where B˙θ is the resulting quantum state at the output of N˙θ ◦F and Z˙ ′θ is the resulting quantum state at the output
of V˙ ′θ ◦ F .
To analyze |χ(p;Z ′θn)−χ(p; Z˙ ′θn)|, we use the technique introduced in [33] and apply the following lemma given in
[5].
Lemma V.1 (Alicki-Fannes Inequality). Suppose we have a composite system PQ with components P and Q.
Let GP and GQ be the Hilbert space of P and Q, respectively. Suppose we have two bipartite quantum states φPQ and
σPQ in S(GPQ) such that ‖φPQ − σPQ‖1 =  < 1, it holds
S(P | Q)ρ − S(P | Q)σ ≤ 4 log(d− 1)− 2h() , (64)
where d is the dimension of GP and h() is defined as in Lemma IV.6.
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We fix an n ∈ N and a θn = (θ1, · · · θn) ∈ Θn. For any an ∈ An we have∣∣∣S (V ′θn(Fn(an)))− S (V˙ ′θn(Fn(an)))∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ n∑
k=1
S
(
V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk,···θn)(Fn(an))
)
− S
(
V ′(θ1,···θk) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn(an))
)∣∣∣∣
≤
n∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣S (V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk,···θn)(Fn(an)))− S (V ′(θ1,···θk) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn(an)))∣∣∣∣ .
For a k ∈ {1, · · · , n} and an = (a1, · · · an) ∈ An, by Lemma V.1 we have∣∣∣∣S (V ′(θ1,···θk+1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk,···θn)(Fn(an)))− S (V ′(θ1,···θk+1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn(an)))∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣S (V ′(θ1,···θk) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk,···θn)(Fn(an)))
− S
(
V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn−1((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
)
− S
(
V ′(θ1,···θk) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn(an))
)
+ S
(
V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn−1((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
)∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣S (V˙ ′θk(ak) | V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn−1((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an))))
− S
(
V ′θk(ak) | V ′(θ1,···θk−1) ⊗ V˙ ′(θk+1,···θn)(Fn−1((a1, · · · ak−1, ak+1, · · · an)))
)∣∣∣∣
≤ 4δ log(dimHE − 1)− 2 · h(δ)
= 4δ log(dimHQ − 1)− 2 · h(δ) . (65)
Thus, ∣∣∣S (V ′θn(Fn(an)))− S (V˙ ′θn(Fn(an)))∣∣∣ ≤ 4nδ log(dimHQ − 1)− 2n · h(δ) . (66)
For any probability distribution p ∈ P (A), n ∈ N, and θn ∈ Θn we have
|χ(p;Z ′θn)− χ(p; Z˙ ′θn)|
=
∣∣∣S(∑
a
p(a)V ′θn(Fn(a)))−
∑
a
p(a)S(V ′θn(Fn(a)))
− S(
∑
a
p(a)V˙ ′θn(F
n(a))) + S(
∑
a
p(a)V˙ ′θn(F
n(a)))
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣S(∑
a
p(a)V ′θn(Fn(a)))− S(
∑
a
p(a)V˙ ′θn(F
n(a)))
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∑
a
p(a)S(V˙ ′θn(F
n(a)))−
∑
a
p(a)S(V˙ ′θn(F
n(a)))
∣∣∣
≤ 8nδ log(dimHQ − 1)− 4n · h(δ) . (67)
We fix a probability distribution q on Θ, a probability distribution p ∈ P (A), and an n ∈ N. By Lemma IV.6 we
have
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|χ(p;Bq)− χ(p; B˙q)|
=
∣∣∣∑
θ
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)Nθ(F (a)))−
∑
θ
∑
a
q(t)p(a)S(Nθ(F (a)))
−
∑
θ
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)N˙θ(F (a))) + S(
∑
θ
∑
a
q(t)p(a)N˙θ(F (a)))
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∑
θ
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)Nθ(F (a)))−
∑
θ
q(t)S(
∑
a
p(a)N˙θ(F (a)))
∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∑
θ
∑
a
q(t)p(a)S(Nθ(F (a)))− S(
∑
θ
∑
a
q(t)p(a)N˙θ(F (a)))
∣∣∣
≤ 8δ log(dimHQ − 1)− 4 · h(δ) . (68)
Thus for any probability distribution q on Θ, n ∈ N, p ∈ P (A), θn ∈ Θn we have for all {N˙θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ∣∣∣(χ(p;Bq)− 1
n
χ(p;Z ′θn))− (χ(p; B˙q)− 1
n
χ(p; Z˙ ′θn))
∣∣∣
≤ 16δ log(dimHQ − 1)− 8 · h(δ) . (69)
For any positive  we can find a positive δ such that 16δ log(dimHQ − 1) − 8 · h(δ) ≤ .
When infq∈P (θ) χ(p;Bq)−maxθn∈Θn χ(p;Z ′θn) achieves its maximum in F and p, and when infq′∈P (θ) χ(p´; ´˙Bq′)−
1
n maxθn′∈Θn χ(p´;
´˙Z ′θn′) achieves its maximum in F´ and p´ for some map F´ : A → S(HP) and a p´ ∈ P (A), where ´˙Bθ
is the resulting quantum state at the output of N˙θ ◦ F´ and ´˙Z ′θ is the resulting quantum state at the output of V˙ ′θ ◦ F´ ,
the following inequality holds.
For all n ∈ N and any positive  we can find a positive δ such that for all {N˙θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ∣∣∣max
p
( inf
q∈P (θ)
χ(p;Bq)− max
θn∈Θn
χ(p;Z ′θn))
−max
p´
( inf
q′∈P (θ)
χ(p´; ´˙Bq′)− 1
n
max
θn′∈Θn
χ(p´; ´˙Z ′θn′))
∣∣∣
≤ 3 , (70)
since elsewise we would have
inf
q∈P (θ)
χ(p; B˙q)− 1
n
max
θn∈Θn
χ(p; Z˙ ′θn)
> inf
q′∈P (θ)
χ(p´; ´˙Bq′)− 1
n
max
θn′∈Θn
χ(p´; ; ´˙Z ′θn′) .
(70) shows Corollary III.7.
Remark V.2. In [22] the continuity of the secrecy capacity of a classical arbitrarily varying channel under randomness
assisted quantum coding has been shown in a similar way (cf. Lemma III.13). That proof is only valid when the alphabet
that the eavesdropper uses is finite. Similarly, our proof of Corollary III.7 only holds when the quantum system of the
environment as eavesdropper has a finite dimension. However, the quantum system of the environment as eavesdropper
can be always chosen such that its dimension is upper bounded by the dimension of the receiver’s system (cf. 65).
Since for the classical case we cannot always expect that the eavesdropper is restrict to a finite alphabet, we may
use another way to overcome the problem (cf. Remark V.2) by giving an alternative proof to Lemma III.13:
Proof. For sets A, B, C and a finite index set Θ, let {(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} be a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel. Here Wθ : P (A)→ P (B) and Vθ : P (A)→ P (C). By [9] we have
Cs({(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}; r) = maxU→A→(BZ)t minθ∈Θ I(pU , Bθ)−maxθ∈Θ I(pU , Zθ) . (71)
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The maximum is taken over all random variables that satisfy the Markov chain relationships: U → A → (BZ)t.
Here Bt are the resulting random variables at the output of legal receiver channels, and Zt are the resulting random
variables at the output of wiretap channels. U is a random variable taking values on some finite set U with probability
distribution pU .
Assume we have a classical arbitrarily varying wiretap channel {(W′θ,V′θ) : θ ∈ Θ}, where W′θ : P (A) → P (B)
and V′θ : P (A)→ P (C), and a positive δ such that
max
a∈A
‖Wθ(a)−W′θ(a)‖1 < δ
and
max
a∈A
‖Vθ(a)− V′θ(a)‖1 < δ
for all θ ∈ θ.
We fix a θ ∈ Θ and a random variable X distributed on A according to a probability distribution px. Let Zθ and
Z ′θ, distributed on Z, be the resulting random variables at the output of Vθ and V′θ, respectively. We have
|I(X,Zθ)− I(X,Z ′θ)|
= |H(X)−H(X|Zθ)−H(X) +H(X|Z ′θ)|
= |H(X|Zθ)−H(X|Z ′θ)|
=
∑
z∈Z
|Vθ(z | pX)− V′θ(z | pX)| ·H(X|Zθ = z)
≤ max
z∈Z
H(X|Zθ = z)
≤  log |A| . (72)
Let Bθ and B′θ be the resulting random variables at the output of Wθ and W′θ, respectively. Similar to (72), we
have
|I(X,Bθ)− I(X,B′θ)| ≤  log |A| . (73)
Combining (71) with (72) and (73) we have
|Cs({(Wθ,Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}; r)− Cs({((W′θ,V′θ) : θ ∈ Θ}; r)| ≤ 2 log |A| . (74)
This shows that in the classical case also, the continuity does not depend on some unknown strategy of the eaves-
dropper.
Corollary III.8 and Corollary III.10 are direct consequences of Corollary III.7 when we apply the techniques in [18]
for the discontinuity points of classical-quantum channels to Theorem III.1 and Corollary III.7.
Now we are going to prove Corollary III.8.
Proof. At first we assume that the secrecy capacity of {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} under randomness assisted quantum coding is
positive and F({Nθ : θ}) = 0. We choose a positive  such that Cs({Nθ : θ}; r) − := C > 0. By Corollary III.7, the
secrecy capacity under randomness assisted quantum coding is continuous. Thus there exist a positive δ such that for
all {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have
Cs ({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}; r) ≥ Cs ({Nθ : θ}; r)−  .
Now we assume that there is a {N ′′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ such that F({N ′′θ : θ}) > 0. This means that {N ′′θ : θ} is not
symmetrizable. By Theorem III.1 it holds
Cs ({N ′′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) = Cs ({N ′′θ : θ}; r) ≥ C > 0 .
{Nθ : θ} is symmetrizable since F({Nθ : θ}) = 0. By Theorem III.1,
Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) = 0 .
Therefore the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} when 1) and 2) hold.
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Now let us consider the case when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
We fix a L ∈ N, a τ ∈ C(ΘL | S(HAL)), and ρL, ρL′ ∈ S(HAL). The map
{Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} → 1
2L
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL)NθL(ρL′)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)NθL(ρL)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
is continuous in the following sense: When
1
2L
∥∥∥ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL)NθL(ρL′)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)NθL(ρL)
∥∥∥
1
= C
holds, then for every positive δ and any {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have∣∣∣∣∣ 12L ‖ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL)N ′θL(ρL
′
)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)N ′θL(ρL)‖1 − C
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2δ .
Thus if for a τ ∈ C(ΘL | A) we have
1
2L
∥∥∥ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | aL)NθL(ρL′)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)NθL(ρL)
∥∥∥
1
= C > 0
for all ρL, ρL′ ∈ A, we also have
1
2L
∥∥∥∥∥ ∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL)N ′θL(ρL
′
)−
∑
θL∈ΘL
τ(θL | ρL′)N ′θL(ρL)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ C − 2δ .
When F({Nθ : θ}) > 0 holds, then there is at least one L ∈ N such that FL({Nθ : θ}) > 0. We can find a positive δ
such that FL({W ′θ : θ}) > 0, and thus F({W ′θ : θ}) > 0) holds for all {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ. By Theorem III.1, it holds
Cs ({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) = Cs ({N ′θ : θ}; r) ≥ C > 0 .
By Corollary III.7, Cs ({N ′θ : θ}; r) is continuous.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, F({Nθ : θ}) cannot be positive.
We consider now that F({Nθ : θ}) = 0 holds. By Theorem III.1,
Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} = 0 .
When for every {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ we have F({N ′θ : θ}) = 0, then by Theorem III.1
Cs({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) = 0 ,
and the deterministic secrecy capacity is thus continuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, for every positive δ there is a
{N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ such that F({N ′θ : θ}) > 0.
When for every positive δ there is a {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ such that F({N ′θ : θ}) > 0 and Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, r) = 0
holds, then by Theorem III.1 we have
Cs({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}) = Cs({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}, r) ,
and the deterministic secrecy capacity is continuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Therefore, when the deterministic secrecy capacity is discontinuous at {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, r) must be
positive.
Corollary III.11 states that the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is, in
general, not continuous. We show Corollary III.11 by giving an example.
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Example V.3. Let Θ := {1(+), 1(−), 2(+), 2(−)} and {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} be defined as in Example V.4 in Section VB.
Let {|0〉A, |1〉A} be a set of orthonormal vectors on HA. Let {|0〉B, |1〉B, |2〉B, |3〉B, |4〉B, |5〉B|6〉B} be a set of
orthonormal vectors on HB. Let λ be ∈ [0, 1]. We define a map Wλ
1(+)
: S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ (1− λ)c1|0〉〈0|B + (1− λ)c2|1〉〈1|B
+ (1− λ)c3|1〉〈0|B + (1− λ)c3|0〉〈1|B + λ(c1 + c2)|3〉〈3|B
= (1− λ)W1(+)
(
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
)
+ λ(c1 + c2)|3〉〈3|B ,
a map Wλ
1(−) : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ (1− λ)c1|0〉〈0|B + (1− λ)c2|1〉〈1|B
− (1− λ)c3|1〉〈0|B − (1− λ)c3|0〉〈1|B + λ(c1 + c2)|4〉〈4|B
= (1− λ)W1(−)
(
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
)
+ λ(c1 + c2)|4〉〈4|B ,
a map Wλ
2(+)
: S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ (1− λ)c1|1〉〈1|B + (1− λ)c2|2〉〈2|B
+ (1− λ)c3|2〉〈1|B + (1− λ)c3|1〉〈2|B + λ(c1 + c2)|5〉〈5|B
= (1− λ)W2(+)
(
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
)
+ λ(c1 + c2)|5〉〈5|B ,
and a map Wλ
2(−) : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ (1− λ)c1|1〉〈1|B + (1− λ)c2|2〉〈2|B
− (1− λ)c3|2〉〈1|B − (1− λ)c3|1〉〈2|B + λ(c1 + c2)|6〉〈6|B
= (1− λ)W2(−)
(
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
)
+ λ(c1 + c2)|6〉〈6|B .
These maps are obviously linear and trace-preserving. They are also completely positive: When
(
c1 c3
c3 c2
)
is positive
semidefinite then all its leading principal minors are non-negative, therefore c1 and c2 are non-negative.(1− λ)c1 (1− λ)c3 0(1− λ)c3 (1− λ)c2 0
0 0 λ(c1 + c2)

is a matrix with positive semidefinite matrices on its diagonal, and thus, also positive semidefinite.
i) If λ is not equal to zero, then {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetric.
Let υ and φ be two arbitrary quantum states ∈ S(HA). We suppose that there are two distributions pυ and pφ on
Θ such that ∑
θ∈Θ
pφ(θ) ·Wλθ (υ) =
∑
θ∈Θ
pυ(θ) ·Wλθ (φ) .
We have
(1− λ)
∑
θ∈Θ
pυ(θ)Wθ(φ) + λ[pυ(1
(+))|3〉〈3|B + pυ(1(−))|4〉〈4|B
+ pυ(2
(+))|5〉〈5|B + pυ(2(−))|6〉〈6|B]
= (1− λ)
∑
θ∈Θ
pφ(θ)Wθ(υ) + λ[pφ(1
(+))|3〉〈3|B + pφ(1(−))|4〉〈4|B
+ pφ(2
(+))|5〉〈5|B + pφ(2(−))|6〉〈6|B] . (75)
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If λ 6= 0, (75) implies that
pφ(θ) = pυ(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ.
If {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} was symmetric, i.e., if there existed a parametrized set of distributions {pρ(·) : ρ ∈ S(HA)} on
Θ such that for all ρ, ρ′ ∈ S(HA), and if λ 6= 0 ∑θ∈Θ pρ′(θ)Wλθ (ρ) = ∑θ∈Θ pρ(θ)Wλθ (ρ′), by (75) there would be a
distribution p′ on Θ such that
p′(θ) = pρ(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ and ρ ∈ S(HA).
But there is clearly no such distribution p′ such that
∑
θ∈Θ p
′(θ)Wλθ (ρ) =
∑
θ∈Θ p
′(θ)Wλθ (ρ
′). For example∑
θ∈Θ
p′(θ)Wλθ (|0〉〈0|A) =
∑
θ∈Θ
p′(θ)Wλθ (|1〉〈1|A)
implies that
p′(1(+)) = −p′(1(−))
and
p′(2(+)) = −p′(2(−)) ,
but
p′(1(+))Wλ1(+)(|0〉〈0|A)− p′(1(+))Wλ1(−)(|0〉〈0|A)
+ p′(2(+))Wλ2(+)(|0〉〈0|A)− p′(2(+))Wλ2(−)(|0〉〈0|A)
= p′(1(+))Wλ1(+)(
1
2
[|0〉〈0|A + |1〉〈1|A + |1〉〈0|A + |0〉〈1|A])
− p′(1(+))Wλ1(−)(
1
2
[|0〉〈0|A + |1〉〈1|A + |1〉〈0|A + |0〉〈1|A])
+ p′(2(+))Wλ2(+)(
1
2
[|0〉〈0|A + |1〉〈1|A + |1〉〈0|A + |0〉〈1|A])
− p′(2(+))Wλ2(−)(
1
2
[|0〉〈0|A + |1〉〈1|A + |1〉〈0|A + |0〉〈1|A])
implies that
p′(1(+)) = −p′(1(−)) = p′(2(+)) = −p′(2(−)) = 0 .
This is of course a contradiction to the assumption that p′ is a distribution on Θ. Thus {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetric.
ii) There is a positive η and a positive λ′ such that for any positive γ ≤ λ′ the randomness assisted secrecy capacity
of {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} is larger than η.
Let the sender’s encoding be restricted to {|0〉A, |1〉A}. We have a classical-quantum channel. By [13], the classical-
quantum secrecy capacity of {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} can be lower bounded by
max
P on {0,1}
(
min
Q∈Q
χ
(
P,WλQ
)− lim
n→∞ maxθn∈Θn
1
n
χ(Pn, V λθn)
)
,
where {V λθ : θ ∈ Θ}: S(HA) → S(HE) are the channels where the wiretapper observes the outputs, and Q is the set
of distributions on Θ.
The Kraus representations and the Stinespring dilation of Wλθ , θ ∈ Θ are simple. It is easy to verify that the
following fact holds:
When the sender sends the state ρ, and when the legal channel to the receiver can be represented by Kraus matrices
(A1, A2, · · · ), the quantum state which the environment obtains can be written in matrix form
(A∗i ρAj)i,j .
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Thus for all θ ∈ Θ, V λθ
((
c1 c3
c3 c2
))
can be written as (minus the zero rows and columns, and to another set of basis
vectors for each θ ∈ Θ, of course)
(1− λ)(c1 + c2) 0 00 λc1 λc3
0 λc3 λc2
 .
We assume that θ, the channel information, is known by a eavesdropper who has access to the complete environment.
Thus we may assume that this eavesdropper knows to which basis its output can be represented in the above matrix
form, i.e., when c1|0〉〈0|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A + (1 − c1)|1〉〈1|A is transmitted, the eavesdropper can find a set
of orthonormal vectors {|0〉E , |1〉E , |2〉E} on HE and perform a transformation to his output such that it obtains
λc1|0〉〈0|E + λc3|1〉〈0|E + λc3|0〉〈1|E + λ(1 − c1)|1〉〈1|E (1 − λ)|2〉〈2|E . If it is not able to do this, the amount of
information it gathers will be, of course, less.
Let P be a probability distribution on the set {|0〉A, |1〉A}, such that P (|0〉A) = a0 and P (|1〉A) = a1, a0 + a1 = 1.
When the sender’s encoding is restricted to {|0〉A, |1〉A}, then for any θn ∈ Θn we have
1
n
χ(Pn, V λθn)
= − 1
n
∑
0≤k1,k2,k3≤n:
k1+k2+k3=n
(
n
k1, k2, k3
)
(1− λ)k1λk2ak20 λk3ak31 log((1− λ)k1λk2ak20 λk3ak31 )
+
1
n
∑
0≤k1,k2,k3≤n:
k1+k2+k3=n
(
n
k1, k2, k3
)
(1− λ)k1λk2ak20 λk3ak31 log((1− λ)k1λk2λk3)
= − 1
n
∑
0≤k1,k2,k3≤n:
k1+k2+k3=n
(
n
k1, k2, k3
)
(1− λ)k1λk2ak20 λk3ak31 log(ak20 ak31 )
≤ −λ 1
n
∑
0≤k1,k2,k3≤n:
k1+k2+k3=n
(
n
k1, k2, k3
)
ak20 a
k3
1 log(a
k2
0 a
k3
1 )
≤ λ 1
n
H(Pn)
= λ . (76)
We consider a positive λ1 such that for any 0 < λ ≤ λ1, we have
lim
n→∞ maxθn∈Θn
1
n
χ(Pn, V λθn) ≤
1
4
C ,
where C is the random capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel (W 0θ )θ∈Θ, which is positive by
Example V.4 in Section VB.
The function [0, 1] → R: λ → minQ∈Q χ
(
P,WλQ
)
is continuous. Thus there is a positive λ2 such that for any
0 < λ ≤ λ2, we have
min
Q∈Q
χ
(
P,WλQ
) ≥ 3
4
C .
For all 0 < λ ≤ min{λ1, λ2}, we have
max
P on {0,1}
(
min
Q∈Q
χ
(
P,WλQ
)− lim
n→∞ maxθn∈Θn
1
n
χ(Pn, V λθn)
)
≥ 1
4
C . (77)
Since the random security capacity of the arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} is large or equal
to the random security capacity of the arbitrarily varying classical-quantum channel when the sender’s encoding is
restricted to {|0〉A, |1〉A}, (77) proves ii).
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By i) and ii), when λ ∈]0, 1] approaches zero, the deterministic secrecy capacity of {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} does not
approach zero, which is the deterministic secrecy capacity of {W 0θ : θ ∈ Θ} by Example V.4 in Section VB. Thus the
deterministic secrecy capacity of {Wλθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not continuous at zero.
Now we are going to prove Corollary III.10.
Proof. Suppose we have Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) > 0. Then {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable, which means that F({Nθ : θ})
is positive. In the proof of Corollary III.8 we show that F is continuous. Thus there is a positive δ′ such that F({N ′θ : θ})
> 0 for all {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ′ . When {Nθ : θ ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable then we have Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}, r) =
Cs({Nθ : θ ∈ Θ}) > 0. By Corollary 5.1 in [17], the secrecy capacity under randomness assisted quantum coding is
continuous. Thus there is a positive δ′′ such that Cs({N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ}, r) > 0 for all {N ′θ : θ ∈ Θ} ∈ Cδ′′ . We define δ :=
min(δ′, δ′′) and the Corollary is shown.
B. Further Notes and Super-Activation
Theorem III.1 states that either the deterministic security capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is
zero, or it equals its randomness assisted security capacity. There are actually arbitrarily varying quantum channels
which have zero deterministic security capacity but achieve a positive security capacity, if the sender and the legal
receiver can use a resource (cf. Example V.4). This shows that the Ahlswede Dichotomy is indeed a “dichotomy”, and
how helpful a resource can be for the robust and secure message transmission.
Now we give an example when the deterministic secrecy capacity of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel is not
equal to its randomness assisted secrecy capacity.
As already mentioned in Section IVA, Example V.4 shows a case when the deterministic secrecy capacity of an
arbitrarily varying quantum channel is equal to zero while its randomness assisted secrecy capacity is positive.
If the previously mentioned conjecture in [3] is true, i.e., if this behavior does not occur for the entanglement
distillation capacity, the entanglement generating capacity, and the strong subspace transmission capacity, then it is
not possible to find any respective examples for those capacities.
Example V.4. Let the sender’s quantum system be presented by HA = C2. Let the receiver’s quantum system be pre-
sented by HB = C3. We choose an orthonormal basis {|0〉A, |1〉A} on HA and an orthonormal basis {|0〉B, |1〉B, |2〉B}
on HB.
i) Definition of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel
Let Θ := {1(+), 1(−), 2(+), 2(−)} be a set of indices. We describe an arbitrarily varying quantum channel {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ}
in the following way: We define a map W1(+) : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|0〉〈0|B + c2|1〉〈1|B + c3|1〉〈0|B + c3|0〉〈1|B ,
a map W (−)1 : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|0〉〈0|B + c2|1〉〈1|B − c3|1〉〈0|B − c3|0〉〈1|B ,
a map W2(+) : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|1〉〈1|B + c2|2〉〈2|B + c3|2〉〈1|B + c3|1〉〈2|B ,
and a map W2(−) : S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|1〉〈1|B + c2|2〉〈2|B − c3|2〉〈1|B − c3|1〉〈2|B .
It is easy to verify that all these maps are linear and trace preserving, it is also easy to verify that W1(+) and
W2(+) are complete positive. W1(−) is complete positive, since for any ρ ∈ S(HA), W1(+)(ρ) and W1(−)(ρ) are unitarily
equivalent. Similarly,W2(−)(ρ) is unitarily equivalent toW2(+)(ρ) for every ρ ∈ S(HA) and thereforeW2(−) is complete
positive, too.
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W1(+) , W1(−) , W2(+) , and W2(−) are unitary transformations, they have very simple Kraus representations (consist
of only one matrix) and very simple Stinespring dilations (a identity matrix on a subspace). It is easy to verify that
there is a vector |0〉〈0|E on HE, the environment space, such that the channel Vθ from the sender to the environment
can be described as
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A → (c1 + c2)|0〉〈0|E
for all four θ ∈ Θ.
ii) L-symmetrizability for all L ∈ N
We fix an arbitrary L ∈ N. For every ρL ∈ S(HAL) we define a parametrized set of distributions q˜ρL on {ΘL : θ ∈
{0, 1}} by
q˜ρL(θ
L) :=
(⊗Li=1〈θi|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|θi〉A)
for jL = (j1, · · · , jL).
We define a map g : ΘL → {0, 1}L in the following way. For every θL = (k(s1)1 , k(s2)2 , · · · , k(sL)L ) ∈ ΘL, ki ∈ {1, 2},
si ∈ {+,−}, we define
g(θL) := (k1 − 1, k2 − 1, · · · kL − 1) .
We define a parametrized set of distributions {qρL(·) : ρ ∈ S(HAL)} on ΘL by
qρL(θ
L) :=
1
2L
q˜Lρ (g(θ
L)) .
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For all ρL, ρ′L ∈ S(HAL) it holds∑
θL∈ΘL
qρ′L(θ
L)WθL(ρ
L)
=
∑
θL∈ΘL
qρ′L
∑
j′L∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A)WθL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉〈j′i|A)
=
1
2L
∑
θL∈ΘL
(⊗Li=1〈g(θL)i|A) ρ′L (⊗Li=1|g(θL)i〉A)
·
 ∑
j′L∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A) (⊗Li=1|j′i + g(θL)i〉〈j′i + g(θL)i|B)

=
∑
jL∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈ji|A) ρ′L (⊗Li=1|ji〉A)
·
 ∑
j′L∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A) (⊗Li=1|j′i + ji〉〈j′i + ji|B)

=
∑
mL∈{0,1,2}L
∑
jL,j′L∈{0,1}L:jL+j′L=mL
(⊗Li=1〈ji|A) ρ′L (⊗Li=1|ji〉A)
· (⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A) [⊗Li=1|mi〉〈mi|B]
=
∑
j′L∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A)
·
 ∑
j′L∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈j′i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|j′i〉A) (⊗Li=1|j′i + ji〉〈j′i + ji|B)

=
1
2L
∑
θL∈ΘL
(⊗Li=1〈g(θL)i|A) ρL (⊗Li=1|g(θL)i〉A)
·
 ∑
jL∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈ji|A) ρ′L (⊗Li=1|ji〉A) (⊗Li=1|ji + g(θL)i〉〈ji + g(θL)i|B)

=
∑
θL∈ΘL
qρL
∑
jL∈{0,1}L
(⊗Li=1〈ji|A) ρ′L (⊗Li=1|ji〉A)WθL (⊗Li=1|ji〉〈ji|A)
=
∑
θL∈ΘL
qρL(θ
L)WθL(ρ
′L) ,
where for jL = (j1, · · · , jL) and j′L = (j′1, · · · , j′L) ∈ {0, 1}L we define jL + j′L := (j1 + j′1, · · · , jL + j′L) ∈ {0, 1, 2}L.
Thus {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} is L-symmetrizable.
iii) Positivity of the random security capacity
Let Θ′ := {1, 2} be a finite set of indices. We define a complete positive trace preserving map W1: S(HA)→ S(HB)
by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|0〉〈0|B + c2|1〉〈1|B ,
and a complete positive trace preserving map W2: S(HA) → S(HB) by
c1|0〉〈0|A + c2|1〉〈1|A + c3|1〉〈0|A + c3|0〉〈1|A
→ c1|1〉〈1|B + c2|2〉〈2|B .
Let T and T ′ be the set of distributions on the index set Θ and Θ′, respectively. We consider the case when the
sender’s encoding is restricted to transmitting the indexed finite set of orthogonal quantum states {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A}
on S(HA). For any σ ∈ {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A} we have W1(σ) = W1(+)(σ) = W1(−)(σ) and W2(σ) = W2(+)(σ) = W2(−)(σ).
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For any p ∈ T we define a distribution qp ∈ T ′ by qp(1) = p(1(+)) + p(1(−)) and qp(2) = p(2(+)) + p(2(−)). For any
σ ∈ {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A} we have
p(1(+))W1(+)(σ) + p(1
(−))W1(−)(σ)
+ p(2(+))W2(+)(σ) + p(2
(−))W2(−)(σ)
=
(
p(1(+)) + p(1(−))
)
W1(σ) +
(
p(2(+)) + p(2(−))
)
W2(σ)
= qp(1)W1(σ) + qp(2)W2(σ) .
For any q ∈ T ′ we define a distribution pq ∈ T by pq(1(+)) = q(1), pq(2(+)) = q(2), and pq(1(−)) = pq(2(−)) = 0.
For any σ ∈ {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A} it always holds trivially
q(1)W1(σ) + q(2)W2(σ) = pq(1
(+))W1(+)(σ) + pq(2
(+))W2(+)(σ) .
Thus
min
s∈T
max
p∈P
χ(p,Bs) = min
s′∈T ′
max
p∈P
χ(p,B′s) .
Here P is the set of distributions on the input set {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A}, B′θ is the quantum output of (Wθ)θ∈Θ′ , and Bθ
is the quantum output of {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
We denote by p′ the distribution on {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A} such that p′(|0〉〈0|A) = p′(|1〉〈1|A) = 12 . Let q ∈ [0, 1]. We
define Q(1) = q, Q(2) = 1− q. We have
χ (p′, {WQ(a) : a ∈ A})
= −1
2
q log
1
2
q +
1
2
(1− q) log 1
2
(1− q)− 1
2
log
1
2
+ q log q + (1− q) log(1− q) .
By the differentiation by q, we obtain
1
log e
(
−1
2
log
1
2
q − 1
2
+
1
2
log
1
2
(1− q) + 1
2
+ log q + 1− log(1− q)− 1
)
=
1
2 log e
(log q − log(1− q)) .
This term is equal to zero if and only if q = 12 . By further calculation, one can show that χ
(
p′, {WQ(ρ) : ρ ∈
{|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A}}
)
achieves its minimum when q = 12 . This minimum is equal to − 12 log 14 + 12 log 12 = 12 > 0. Thus
max
p
min
q
χ (p,Bq) ≥ 1
2
.
For any n ∈ N, an arbitrary quantum state ρ⊗n in S(HAn), and an arbitrary sequence θn ∈ Θn, we have Vθn(ρ⊗n)
= |0〉〈0|En . This can be easily shown by induction: For any m ∈ N, we assume ρ⊗m is an arbitrary quantum state in
S(HAm) and θm = (θ1, · · · , θm) is an arbitrary sequence in Θ. It holds Vθm(ρ⊗m) = |0〉〈0|E ⊗ Vθm−1(ρ⊗m−1), where
ρ⊗m−1 is a quantum state in S(HAm−1) and θm−1 = (θ2, · · · , θm). Thus for every p ∈ P and θn ∈ Θn, χ(pn, Zθn)
cannot exceed 1 log 1− 1 log 1 = 0.
Thus
Cs({(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}, r) ≥ 1
2
> 0 = Cs({(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}, r) .
This gives an example of an arbitrarily varying quantum channel such that its deterministic capacity is zero, but its
random capacity is positive.
Thus, a “useless” arbitrarily varying quantum channel, i.e. with zero deterministic secrecy capacity, allows secure
transmission if the sender and the legal receiver have the possibility to use a resource.
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A common property of most classical channels is that where the capacity of two sub-channels, when used together,
is the sum of the their capacities. Particularly, a channel system consisting of two orthogonal classical channels, where
both are “useless” in the sense that they both have zero capacity for message transmission, the capacity for message
transmission of the whole system is zero as well (“0 + 0 = 0”). For the definition of “two orthogonal channels” in
classical systems please see [28].
In contrast to the classical information theory, it is known that the capacities of quantum channels can be super-
additive, i.e., there are cases in which the capacity of the product W1 ⊗W2 of two quantum channels W1 and W2 are
larger than the sum of the capacity of W1 and the capacity of W2 (cf. [34] and [29]). “The whole is greater than the
sum of its parts” - Aristotle.
Particularly in quantum information theory, there are examples of two quantum channels, W1 and W2, with zero
capacity, which allow positive transmission if they are used together, i.e., the capacity of their product W1 ⊗ W2
is positive, (cf. [41], [40], [37] and also [21] for a rare case result when this phenomenon occurs using two classical
arbitrarily varying wiretap channels). This is due to the fact that there are different reasons why a quantum channel
can have zero capacity. If we have two channels which have zero capacity for different reasons, they can “remove” their
weaknesses from each other, or in other words, “activate” each other. We call this phenomenon “super-activation”
(“0 + 0 > 0”).
In our previous work [16] we proved super-activation for arbitrarily varying classical-quantum wiretap channels.
Now we will prove Theorem III.12, i.e., super-activation of secrecy capacities for arbitrarily varying quantum
channels, by giving an example.
Example V.5. Let the sender’s quantum system be presented by HAˆ = C4 and the receiver’s quantum system be
presented by HBˆ = C4. Let Θˆ := {1, 2} be a finite set of indices.
Choosing an orthonormal basis {|0〉Aˆ, |1〉Aˆ, |2〉Aˆ, |3〉Aˆ} on HAˆ and an orthonormal basis {|0〉Bˆ, |1〉Bˆ, |2〉Bˆ, |3〉Bˆ} on
HBˆ, we define a complete positive trace-preserving map Wˆ1: S(HAˆ) → S(HBˆ) with respect to these bases byc00 c01 c02 c03c01 c11 c12 c13c02 c12 c22 c23
c03 c13 c23 c33
→
c00 c01 0 0c01 c11 0 00 0 c22 + c33 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
and a complete positive trace-preserving map Wˆ2: S(HAˆ) → S(HBˆ) with respect to these bases byc00 c01 c02 c03c01 c11 c12 c13c02 c12 c22 c23
c03 c13 c23 c33
→
c00 + c11 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 c22 c23
0 0 c23 c33
 .
With respect to an orthonormal basis {|0〉Eˆ, |1〉Eˆ, |2〉Eˆ, |3〉Eˆ} on HEˆ, Wˆ1 has the Stinespring matrix
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0

.
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The quantum state which the environment obtains isc00 c01 c02 c03c01 c11 c12 c13c02 c12 c22 c23
c03 c13 c23 c33
→
c00 + c11 0 0 00 0 0 00 0 c22 c23
0 0 c23 c33

with respect to the orthonormal basis {|0〉Eˆ, |1〉Eˆ, |2〉Eˆ, |3〉Eˆ} on HEˆ.
With respect to an orthonormal basis {|0〉Eˆ, |1〉Eˆ, |2〉Eˆ, |3〉Eˆ} on HEˆ, Wˆ2 has the Stinespring matrix
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

.
The quantum state which the environment obtains isc00 c01 c02 c03c01 c11 c12 c13c02 c12 c22 c23
c03 c13 c23 c33
→
c00 c01 0 0c01 c11 0 00 0 c22 + c33 0
0 0 0 0

with respect to a orthonormal basis {|0〉Eˆ, |1〉Eˆ, |2〉Eˆ, |3〉Eˆ} on HEˆ.
When we interpret the environment as a wiretapper, then the arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum channel
{(Wˆθ′ , Vˆθ′) : θ′ ∈ Θˆ} has the following property: Wˆ1 and Vˆ2 are identical with respect to the corresponding orthonormal
bases on HBˆ and HEˆ, while Wˆ2 and Vˆ1 are identical with respect to the corresponding orthonormal bases on HBˆ and
HEˆ.
Thus for any input set of quantum states and any probability distribution p on this set we always have
min
i∈Θˆ
χ(p, Wˆθ′)− max
θ′′∈Θˆ
χ(p, Vˆθ′′) = min
θ′∈Θˆ
χ(p, Wˆθ′)− max
θ′′∈Θˆ
χ(p, Wˆθ′′) ≤ 0 . (78)
The secrecy capacity of this arbitrarily varying wiretap quantum channel is thus always zero: Supposed there is a
message set and a code such that for (Wˆθ′ , Vˆθ′), θ′ ∈ Θˆ the sender is able to convey a secure message to the legal
receiver without the wiretapper knowing anything. Then the wiretapper can correctly decode the same encoded message
when it is transmitted with the same decoding operator in corresponding orthonormal bases through (Wˆθ′′ , Vˆθ′′), θ′′ 6= θ′,
while the legal receiver cannot decode anything.
Let {Wθ : θ ∈ Θ} be defined as in Section VB. We now consider {Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ}. For any σ ∈ HAˆ⊗A,
when the channel state is (θ′, θ), the quantum state which the environment obtains is Vˆθ′ ⊗ Vθ(σ). We have
Cs({(Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ, Vˆθ′ ⊗ Vθ) : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ}, r)
≥ Cs({(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ}, r)
=
1
2
.
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We define
ρ1 :=
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(〈0|+ 〈1|)Aˆ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A
and
ρ2 :=
1
2
(|2〉+ |3〉)(〈2|+ 〈3|)Aˆ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A .
If {Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ} is symmetrizable, then there exists a parametrized set of distributions {τ(· | σ) : σ ∈
HAˆ⊗A} on Θˆ×Θ such that∑
(θ′,θ)∈Θˆ×Θ
τ((θ′, θ) | ρ2)Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ(ρ1) =
∑
(θ′,θ)∈Θˆ×Θ
τ((θ′, θ) | ρ1)Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ(ρ2)
⇒ 1
2
(τ((1, 1(+)) | ρ2) + τ((1, 1(−)) | ρ2)) (|0〉+ |1〉) (〈0|+ 〈1|)Aˆ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A
+
1
2
(τ((2, 1(+)) | ρ2) + τ((2, 1(−)) | ρ2))
(
|0〉〈0|Aˆ + |1〉〈1|Aˆ
)
⊗ |0〉〈0|A
+
1
2
(τ((1, 2(+)) | ρ2) + τ((1, 2(−)) | ρ2)) (|0〉+ |1〉) (〈0|+ 〈1|)Aˆ ⊗ |1〉〈1|A
+
1
2
(τ((2, 2(+)) | ρ2) + τ((2, 2(−)) | ρ2))
(
|0〉〈0|Aˆ + |1〉〈1|Aˆ
)
⊗ |1〉〈1|A
=
1
2
(τ((1, 1(+)) | ρ1) + τ((1, 1(−)) | ρ1)) (|2〉+ |3〉) (〈2|+ 〈3|)Aˆ ⊗ |0〉〈0|A
+
1
2
(τ((2, 1(+)) | ρ1) + τ((2, 1(−)) | ρ1))
(
|2〉〈2|Aˆ + |3〉〈3|Aˆ
)
⊗ |0〉〈0|A
+
1
2
(τ((1, 2(+)) | ρ1) + τ((1, 2(−)) | ρ1)) (|2〉+ |3〉) (〈2|+ 〈3|)Aˆ ⊗ |1〉〈1|A
+
1
2
(τ((2, 2(+)) | ρ1) + τ((2, 2(−)) | ρ1))
(
|2〉〈2|Aˆ + |3〉〈3|Aˆ
)
⊗ |1〉〈1|A
⇒ τ((1, 1(+)) | ρ2) + τ((1, 1(−)) | ρ2)
= τ((2, 1(+)) | ρ2) + τ((2, 1(−)) | ρ2)
= τ((1, 2(+)) | ρ2) + τ((1, 2(−)) | ρ2)
= τ((2, 2(+)) | ρ2) + τ((2, 2(−)) | ρ2)
= 0
⇒  . (79)
{Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ} is thus not symmetrizable. By Theorem III.1
Cs({(Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ, Vˆθ′ ⊗ Vθ) : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ})
= Cs({(Wˆθ′ ⊗Wθ, Vˆθ′ ⊗ Vθ) : (θ′, θ) ∈ Θˆ×Θ}, r)
≥ 1
2
.
VI. SECRECY CAPACITY OF QUANTUM COMPOUND CHANNELS
In our earlier work [15] we determined the secrecy capacity of the classical-quantum compound wiretap channel.
Our idea for the case with CSI at the transmitter was sending the information in two parts. Firstly, the sender sent
the state information with finite blocks of finite bits with a public code to the receiver, and then, depending on θ, the
sender sent the message with a secure code in the second part. The following Lemma has been proved in [15].
Lemma VI.1. The secrecy capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel {(Wθ, Vθ)} : θ ∈ Θ} in the
case with CSI is given by
CCSI({Wθ, Vθ} : θ ∈ Θ}) = lim
n→∞minθ∈Θ
max
Pinp,wt
1
n
(χ(Pinp;B
n
θ )− χ(Pinp;Znθ )) (80)
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where Bθ are the resulting random quantum states at the output of legal receiver channels and Zθ are the resulting
random quantum states at the output of wiretap channels. The maximum is taken over all probability distributions
Pinp on the input quantum states wθ.
Assume that the sender’s encoding is restricted to transmitting an indexed finite set of orthogonal quantum states
{ρx : x ∈ A} ⊂ S(H ′⊗n), then the secrecy capacity of the compound classical-quantum wiretap channel {Wθ, Vθ} : θ ∈
Θ} in the case with no CSI at the encoder is given by
CS({(Wθ, Vθ)} : θ ∈ Θ}) = lim
n→∞ maxU→A→(BZ)θ
1
n
(
min
θ∈Θ
χ(U ;Bnθ )
−max
θ∈Θ
χ(U ;Znθ )
)
. (81)
Now we are going to prove Corollary III.14.
Proof. (26) follows immediately from Lemma VI.1.
(25) can be proved in a similar way as Lemma VI.1: The converse is trivial since the secrecy capacity of {(Nθ ◦
F, Vθ ◦ F ) : θ ∈ Θ} with CSI is upper bounded by limn→∞ 1n maxU→A→{(BZ)θ:t} χ(pU ;Bnθ⊗n) −χ(pU ;Znθ ⊗n).
Now we are going to show the achievability. When
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:t}
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )− χ(pU ;Znθ ) ≤ 0
holds, the secrecy capacity of {(Wθ, Vθ) : θ ∈ Θ} with CSI is zero and there is nothing to prove.
Now we assume that
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:t}
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )− χ(pU ;Znθ ) > 0
holds. In this case we showed that in [15] the secrecy capacity of {(Nθ ◦ F, Vθ ◦ F ) : θ ∈ Θ} without CSI is positive
and the sender can build a code C1 =
(
E(1), {Dnθ (1) : θ ∈ Θ}
)
such that the CSI can be sent to the legal receiver with
a block with finite length and the eavesdropper knowing nothing. The first part is of length O(1), which is negligible
compared to the second part.
If both the sender and the legal receiver have the full knowledge of θ, then we only have to look at the single wiretap
channel (Nθ ◦ F, Vθ ◦ F ).
In [23] and [25] it was shown that if n is sufficiently large, there exists an (n, Jn,θ) code for the quantum wiretap
channel (Nθ ◦ F, Vθ ◦ F ) with
log Jn,t = max
U→A→(BZ)θ
(χ(PU ;B
n
θ n)− χ(PU ;Znθ n))−  ,
for any positive  and ζ such that
1− 1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
tr(N⊗nθ ◦ Fn(Eθ( |j))D(θ)j ) <  ,
and
χ
(
Runi;Z
⊗n
θ
)
< ζ .
When the sender and the legal receiver both know θ, they can build an (n, Jn) secure code C
(θ)
2 =
(
E(2), {D(2)j :
j = 1, · · · Jn}
)
to send the message, where
log Jn = min
θ∈Θ
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:θ}
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )− χ(pU ;Znθ )−  .
We define now a code C := (E(1)E(2), {Dnθ (1)⊗D(2)j : θ ∈ Θ, j = 1, · · · Jn}). Since the length of C1 can be negligible
compared to the second part in asymptotic scenarios, we have
CS,CSI ≥ min
θ∈Θ
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→A→{(BZ)θ:θ}
χ(pU ;B
n
θ )− χ(pU ;Znθ ) .
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